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NOTES
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE TO THE CORPORATE
BAR PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES
ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES AND PENNY STOCK
REFORM ACT OF 1990
The primary demand of a Madisonian system of limited government is
to maintain a proper balance between the two opposing principles of public
power and private freedom.1 The principle of public power is self-govern-
1. See Tim FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(articulating necessity for checks and balances). Madison wrote:
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices [checks and balances]
should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must
first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it
to control itself.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Madisonian constitutional ideology was heavily influenced by two different approaches
to statecraft: Classical liberal political theory and classical republican political theory. See
David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L.
& POL. 1, 5-6 (1987) (arguing both liberal theory and classical republican theory contributed
to intellectual basis for federal constitution). Liberal political theory, articulated by John
Locke, asserted that in a pregovernmental society individuals possessed certain natural rights
and private freedoms. See Randy E. Barnett, Are Enumerated Constitutional Rights the Only
Rights We Have? The Case of Associational Freedom, 10 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 102
(1987) (discussing Lockean belief in pregovernmental individual rights). According to liberal
theory, government is created only to preserve legally the individual's private freedom from
the aggressions of fellow citizens; government is not the source of rights, but the guarantor
of preexisting rights. Id. at 102-03. But government itself posed a problem to the Lockean
"rights first-government second" philosophy. Id. at 103. The very existence of government
presented the danger that society at large might employ governmental power to invade an
individual's private arena. See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61
S. CAL. L. REv. 1219, 1237 (1988) (discussing liberal theory's mistrust of coercive governmental
power). Accordingly, government had to be limited in order to prevent opportunities for
society to restrict private freedom. Id. Strictly limiting governmental power to certain functions
would promote individual liberty as well as societal welfare. Id. By imposing constitutional
limitations on governmental power, the Founders intended to protect the private freedoms of
each societal member. See Barnett, supra, at 103-04 (noting influence of Lockean philosophy
on Founders).
Liberal theory's preoccupation with private freedom and the control of governmental
power was at odds with the classical republican political tradition of Thomas Hobbes. See
Millon, supra, at 1238 (contrasting liberal theory with republican theory). Republicanism, or
positivism, specified that the only legal rights one possesses are those recognized by government;
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ment, which entitles the majority of society to control the minority for the
public good.2 The principle of private freedom is that, nonetheless, there
are certain areas in which the minority must be free of majority control.
3
The continual reconciliation of public power and private freedom poses the
"Madisonian dilemma."14 The dilemma is that for government to function
appropriately and to remain viable, neither the freedom of society to govern
government is the source of as well as the guarantor of rights. See Barnett, supra, at 101-02
(noting positivism assumes individual rights do not exist until granted by sovereign). While
liberalism emphasized governmental nonintervention to ensure private welfare, the republican
"government first-rights second" theory stressed governmental or public power to promote
and define the common good. See Millon, supra, at 1238-39 (discussing republicanism's
emphasis on government dedicated to common welfare). The republican tendency to utilize
public power to pursue the general welfare assumed that what was good for society as a whole
ultimately promoted individual welfare. See GoRDoN S. WOOD, TaE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 58 (1969) (noting republican philosophy that "what was good for the
whole community was ultimately good for all the parts"). Accordingly, government must be
invested with sufficient authority to function in the interests of society and to subordinate
excessive emphasis on the private, sectarian interests of individuals. Id. Dividing and subjecting
governmental power to an effective system of checks and balances became the constitutional
mechanism chosen by the Framers to prevent any private element of society from capturing
the state machinery and impeding governmental pursuit of the common good. Id. at 547-53
(discussing republican legacy of separation of federal legislative, executive and judicial powers).
For a more thorough discussion of the influence of both the liberal and republican
political traditions on the Founders, see generally BERNARD BILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); FRANK M. COLMAN, HoBBES AND AMERICA: EXPLORING
THE CONSTrITUToNAL FOUNDATIONS (1977); FORREST McDoNALD, Novus ORwo SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985); JOHN G. POCOCK, Tan MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975);
JACK R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF TnE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (1966); Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas
in the New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1986); Morton J. Horwitz, Republi-
canism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57
(1987); Robert E. Shalhorpe, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 WM. &
MARY Q. 334 (1982).
2. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: TH POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 139 (1990) (describing majority rule aspect of Madisonian system). Madisonian ideology
emphasized the importance of dedicating governmental structure to the welfare of all citizens:
To make the people's welfare-the public good-the exclusive end of government
became for the Americans, as one general put it, their "Polar Star," the central
tenet of the Whig faith, shared ... by any American bitterly opposed to a system
which held "that a Part is greater than its Whole; or, in other Words, that some
Individuals ought to be considered, even to the Destruction of the Community,
which they compose."
WOOD, supra note 1, at 55; see also supra note 1 (describing classical republican political
theory's emphasis on governmental pursuit of public good).
3. See BORK, supra note 2, at 139 (describing minority right aspect to Madisonian
system). The Bill of Rights specifically addresses the areas in which individuals are to be free
from societal control under the Madisonian constitutional framework. Id.; see Harry N.
Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REv.
217, 218 (1984) (noting private rights protected by Bill of Rights); supra note 1 (describing
liberal political theory's rationale for limited government).
4. See Boa.K, supra note 2, at 139-41 (describing "Madisonian dilemma").
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nor the freedom of the individual not to be governed should emerge as
completely dominant.'
Madisonian democratic theory insists on a divided world in which the
public interests of the state are in continual tension with the private interests
of the individual. 6 By displaying traits of both public power and private
freedom, the corporation fits uncomfortably into a well-demarcated Madi-
sonian society.7 In one capacity the public power of society determines the
existence of a corporation's private interests.8 Yet, in another capacity, the
5. See id. at 139 (noting risk of either tyranny of majority or tyranny of minority);
Millon, supra note 1, at 1239, 1245 (noting republican theory's fear of factional tyranny and
liberal theory's fear of mob tyranny); Saul K. Padover, Management and Government: The
Balancing Sovereignties, in THE PowEas AND DuTiEs OF CoRPoRAT MANAGEMENT 262, 267,
272 (Edmond N. Cahn ed., 1950) (noting in Madisonian system nothing is more threatening
to social order than private freedom without public control).
6. See OTTO V. GIERCE, PourricA. THnooEs oF T MIDDLE AGE 87 (Frederic W.
Maitland trans., 1927) (describing foundations of modem political theories). Gierke's monu-
mental work contrasted the more unified medieval conception of society with the modem
vision of the world in which "[t]he Sovereignty of the State and the Sovereignty of the
Individual were steadily on their way towards becoming the two central axioms from which
all theories of social structure would proceed, and whose relationship to each other would be
the focus of all theoretical controversy." Id.; see also Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal
Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1086-89 (1980) (discussing Gierke's description of medieval
society).
7. See CHAR.Ls E. LINDBLOM, PoLmcs AND MARKERs 356 (1977) (stating corporation
"fits oddly into democratic theory and vision. Indeed if does not fit."); Edwin M. Epstein,
The Historical Enigma of Corporate Legitimacy, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1701, 1701 (1972) (reviewing
JAMEs W. HURST, Tam LEGITI cY OF THE BusIns CORPORATION IN TE LAW OF THE UNmD
STATES, 1780-1970 (1970)) (stating "[i]n a society where the Rule of Law rather than the Rule
of Men is presumed to be a foundation of the'constitutional order, the American business
corporation has been an enigma."); see also Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation
in Antebellum Political Culture, 102 HARe. L. R v. 1883, 1890 (1989) (noting intermediate
position of corporation between sovereignty of state and liberty of individual).
8. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 205-11 (de-
scribing "artificial entity" conception of corporation). The "artificial entity" theory of the
corporation holds the corporation to owe its existence to the positive law of the state. Id. at
206. In American jurisprudence, Chief Justice John Marshall penned the classic formulation
of the artificial entity theory: "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental
to its very existence." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
636 (1819); see also BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 340 (6th ed. 1990) (defining corporation as
artificial or legal entity created by or under laws of state); John C. Coates IV, Note, State
Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv.
806, 810-15 (1989) (describing "artificial entity" theory).
Regarding the subordination of corporations to the state, the "concession" theory roughly
parallels the "artificial entity" theory. Professor Maitland provided the classic formulation of
the concession theory: "The corporation is, and must be, the creature of the State. Into its
nostrils the State must breathe the breath of a fictitious life, for otherwise it would be no
animated body but individual dust." Frederic W. Maitland, Introduction to GIERcE, supra
note 6, at xx. In similar fashion, according to Professor Dahl:
[I]t is absurd to regard the corporation simply as an enterprise established for the
sole purpose of allowing profit-making. One has simply to ask: Why should citizens,
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:987
private rights of the corporation are impervious to societal control. 9 The
"corporate dilemma" is that for the corporation to operate both successfully
and legitimately within the broader societal framework, neither the public's
ability to control the corporation nor the corporation's private freedom
from public control should be subordinated permanently.'0 For centuries
both English and American societies continually struggled to preserve the
interdependent relationship between a corporation's counterpoised attributes
of public control and private freedom."
The historically anomalous 2 nineteenth-century division of corporations
into distinct categories of so-called "public" and "private" corporations
largely diffused questions concerning the appropriate relation between the
public's ability to control the corporation and the corporation's right to be
free of such control. 3 By assimilating public corporations to the role of the
state in society-subject to popular control14-and private corporations to
the role of the individual in society-free from public control'S-nineteenth-
century doctrine apparently resolved the dilemma posed by the enigmatic
corporation.
through their government, grant special rights, powers, privileges, and protections
to any firm except on the understanding that its activities are to fulfill their purposes?
Corporations exist because we allow them to do so.
Robert A. Dahl, Governing the Giant Corporation, in CoRPoRATE POWER iN AmRICA 10-I1
(Ralph Nader & Mark J. Green eds., 1973) (emphasis in original); see also C.T. CAu, GENERAL
PRINcIPLE OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 164-73 (1905) (noting concession theory emphasizes
that corporations require state approval for existence and that corporateness is special privilege
granted by state). According to Carr, the English law of corporations adhered to the concession
theory. Id. at 171; accord Frederick Pollock, Has the Common Law Received the Fiction
Theory of Corporations, 27 LAW Q. REv. 219, 235 (1911) (arguing England accepted concession
theory but not artificial entity theory).
9. See Millon, supra note 8, at 211-19 (describing "natural entity" theory of corpora-
tions); Coates, supra note 8, at 818-25 (same). Under the natural entity conception of the
corporation the state has no more power to impose its will on corporations than it does on a
natural person. Id. at 819. Since classical liberal theory recognized the right of natural persons
to hold property, the natural entity theory entitles corporations to the same. See Millon, supra
note 1, at 1237 (noting central importance of property interests to liberal theory); see also
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388-89 (1798) (recognizing importance of protecting
individual property interests from legislative abrogation).
10. See ERNsT FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 39-42 (2d ed. 1965)
(describing dilemma posed by corporation). According to Freund, "[i]n its various forms of
ecclesiastical bodies and foundations, gilds, municipalities, trading companies, or business
organizations, the corporation has always presented the same problem of how to check the
tendency of group action to undermine the liberty of the individual or to rival the political
power of the state." Id. at 39.
11. See infra notes 102-43 and accompanying text (describing attempts by earlier societies
to maintain proper balance between public control and private freedom).
12. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (arguing division between public and
private corporations did not exist prior to nineteenth century).
13. See infra notes 149-91 and accompanying text (describing events leading to nineteenth-
century division of corporations into separate public and private categories).
14. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text (describing nineteenth-century relegation
of public corporations to public control).
15. See infra notes 158-75 and accompanying text (describing nineteenth-century deter-
mination to accord private corporation individual constitutional rights).
CORPORATE BAR
Although the dichotomy between public and private corporations con-
tinues to structure conventional thinking about corporations, the massive
amount of recent scholarly commentary on corporations seems to indicate
a widespread dissatisfaction with the present, bifurcated conception of the
corporation.' 6 Most of this commentary suggests the need to reshape cor-
16. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMINo THE GIANT CORORATON 63 (1976) (advo-
cating federal chartering of corporations); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDs:
THE SOCIAL CoNT OL OF CORPoRATE BEHAVIOR 71-73 (1975) [hereinafter STONE, WHERE THE
LAW ENDs] (recommending need to translate spirit of corporate social responsibility movement
into tangible institutional reform); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and
the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 CoLuM. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1985) (arguing shareholders lack
requisites to control management); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700-03 (1974) (advocating federal role in conducting
corporations); Lewis D. Solomon & Kathleen J. Collins, Humanistic Economics: A New Model
for the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate, 12 J. CoR'. L. 331, 335 (1987) (suggesting
corporations "profit from 'social' activities that ... combat insensitivity to society's changing
demands thereby reducing public pressures for governmental intervention") (footnotes omitted);
David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5-85
(1979) (discussing alternatives of compulsory or voluntary corporate reform); J.A.C. Hether-
ington, Facts and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility,
21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 274-91 (1969) (noting business operates within broader social framework);
Philip A. Loomis, Jr., & Beverly K. Rubman, Corporate Governance in Historical Perspective,
8 HOFSTRA L. Ray. 141, 141-43 (1979) (noting similar corporate reform movement in early
twentieth century); Louis B. Lundborg & Henry G. Manne, Private Corporations and Social
Responsibility, in REouLATIoN, EcONORcs, AND THE LAW 25-39 (Bernard H. Siegan ed., 1979)
(debating whether corporations should engage in activities intended to further overall societal
interests); Henry G. Manne, The Limits and Rationale of Corporate Altruism: An Individualistic
Model, 59 VA. L. REiv. 708, 708-723 (1973) (noting good business reasons for corporate social
activity); Jerry L. Mashaw, Corporate Social Responsibility: Comments on the Legal and
Economic Context of a Continuing Debate, 3 YALE L. & PoL'y REv. 114, 115 (1984) (debating
proper place of corporate social responsibility in corporate decision making); Arthur S. Miller,
A Modest Proposal for Helping to Tame the Corporate Beast, 8 HOFsTRA L. REv. 79, 79
(1979) (arguing corporations should be treated as collectives rather than persons); Howard L.
Oleck, Remedies for Abuses of Corporate Status, 9 WAKE FoRasT L. RaV. 463, 465-66 (1973)
(questioning limited personal liability of members of private corporations); Donald E. Schwartz,
Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-Existence With Society, 60 GEo. L.J. 57, 75-103 (1971)
(suggesting need for socially oriented corporate policies); Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Corpora-
tions and Social Responsibility: In Search of the Corporate Soul, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
709, 722-36 (1974) [hereinafter Stevenson, Corporate Soul] (proposing mechanisms to promote
socially responsible corporate behavior); Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The Corporation as a
Political Institution, 8 HoFsTRA L. REV. 39, 45-61 (1979) (suggesting politicization of corpo-
ration as means of inducing corporate responsibility); Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social
Responsibility: What it Might Mean, If it Were Really to Matter, 71 IowA L. Rav. 557, 560-
66 (1986) (discussing both interventionism and voluntarism branches of corporate responsibility
movement); Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of Its Future, 81 CoLum. L. RaV.
1611, 1660-66 (1981) (noting limitations of corporate reform movement); Oliver Williamson,
Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1197-98 (1984) (focusing on economics of corporate
governance in microanalytic terms).
Other commentators resist the social responsibility movement. See, e.g., ROBERT L.
HEILBRONER, THE Lnfs OF AMERICAN CAPITALisM 55 (1966) (contending "[flor perhaps the
first time in American history there is no longer any substantial intellectual opposition to the
system of business nor any serious questioning of its economic privileges and benefits.");
RALPH K. WINTER, GovERNrNT AND Tm CORPORATION 44-68 (1978) (criticizing suggestions
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porate practice in a manner that would mandate private corporations to be
mindful of their social responsibilities . 7 From another perspective, the social
responsibility movement seeks to restore a degree of public control over the
private corporation. 8
for social control of corporate power); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Move-
ment, 35 VAMN. L. REV. 1259, 1259-92 (1982) (supporting traditional methods of corporate
governance); Robert Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private
Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1349-50 (1979) (denying justifications for corporate
social responsibility); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. Tiams, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 (stating "the social responsibility
of business is to increase its profits.").
Another aspect of the corporate responsibility movement is directed specifically at cor-
porate managers. See, e.g., STONE, WHREa TaE LAW ENDS, supra, at 152-83 (proposing
companies designate certain percentage of directors to protect public interests); Alfred F.
Conard, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941, 941-61 (1977)
(suggesting possibility of placing public interest directors on corporate boards); William 0.
Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HAgv. L. Ra,. 1305, 1329 (1934) (noting lack of
social-mindedness of corporate directors); B.R. Jouett, The Responsibility of Directors of
Corporations, 58 AM. L. REv. 384, 385-400 (1924) (suggesting public responsibilities for
corporate managers); Marshall L. Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate
Governance, 30 HAsTINGs L.J. 1353, 1355-1403 (1979) (discussing recent changes in governance
of corporate executives).
As the literature on corporate social responsibility suggests, and as several authors note,
after a period of relative stability, the conceptual understanding of the corporation is once
again in a period of transition. See Milon, supra note 8, at 203 (noting revived corporate
theory debate in hostile takeover context); Coates, supra note 8, at 807 (arguing debate over
hostile takeovers indicates that meaning of word corporation remains unsettled). Coates also
lists other contexts in which the abstract questions of corporate theory have begun to reemerge,
notably corporate criminal liability and corporate first amendment rights. Id. at 807 n.7; cf.
Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American
Law, 54 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1441, 1441 (1987) (arguing following Second World War "the
corporation as a legal institution" ceased to be either "controversial" or "of interest");
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
VA. L. Rav. 173, 175 (1985), reprinted in CORPORATIONS AND SocIaY: POWER AND RESPON-
smturY 13 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) (subsequent page references to
reprint) (stating after 1930 issue of defining corporations "vanished from controversy").
17. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv.
L. Rv. 1145, 1153-63 (1932) [hereinafter Dodd, Trustees] (suggesting corporate managers owe
responsibilities to society as well as to corporate shareholders). Professor Dodd attempted to
justify corporate policies that benefitted nonshareholder constituencies and resulted in lost
profits. Id. at 1147-48. Dodd essentially argued that a corporation should act as a good citizen.
Id. at 1154-55. Dodd's article responded to an article by Professor Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. Rv. 1049, 1049 (1931), suggesting
corporations existed solely for the private gain of stockholders. The ensuing exchange between
Berle and Dodd formed the foundations for the modern social responsibility movement. See
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. Rav.
1365, 1367-70 (1932) (arguing modern business corporation lacks social responsibility); E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers
Practicable?, 2 U. Cm. L. Rav. 194, 205-07 (1935) (questioning Berle's position that managers
of private corporations should not serve nonshareholder constituencies). See generally Joseph
L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLuM. L. REv.
1458 (1964) (noting current relevance of Berle-Dodd exchange on concept of corporation).
18. See Stevenson, Corporate Soul, supra note 16, at 722-36 (comparing various me-
CORPORATE BAR
The recently enacted corporate bar provisions of the Securities Enforce-
ment Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (Remedies Act)19 may
reflect a heightened sensitivity by Congress-representative of society at
large-to the notion that even traditionally private corporations should be
subject to a degree of social control.2 By authorizing courts to intervene
on behalf of the public in a corporation's internal affairs, the corporate
bar is difficult to square with the conventional, almost canonical, idea of
the private corporation as an institution considered largely autonomous
from social control.21 When viewed from an historical perspective, however,
neither the underlying objective of nor the method employed by23 the
corporate bar is without precedent. If the purpose of the corporate bar is
to protect the public from today's manipulative corporate trading practices,
the corporate bar parallels the spirit of earlier legislative attempts to safe-
guard societal welfare from similarly disruptive market practices. 24 Arguably
resembling an earlier, broader vision of the corporation, the corporate bar
may evidence a willingness of Congress to rethink the proper relationship
between the corporation's private freedom and society's public power.
I. THE CoR'oRATE BAR
Congress enacted the Remedies Act to provide the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) with additional remedies to maximize the SEC's
enforcement of the federal securities laws.? One impetus behind the 'Rem-
edies Act came from the perception that the SEC's existing enforcement
chanisms capable of influencing corporate behavior). Several techniques exist for asserting
public control of private corporations. Id. The current method of maintaining public control
of corporations centers around an ad hoc, after-the-fact body of legislative regulation that
forbids undesirable corporate conduct. Id. at 722. By contrast, past practices placed greater
emphasis on inserting public control of corporations during the incorporation stage. See infra
notes 177-79, 183-86 and accompanying text (discussing restrictive features of both special and
general incorporation acts).
19. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
20. See infra notes 25-45 and accompanying text (outlining corporate bar provisions of
Remedies Act).
21. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (defining private corporations).
22. Compare infra notes 27-28, 48-49 and accompanying text (noting purpose of corporate
bar to ensure public confidence in securities markets) with infra notes 111-14 and accompanying
text (noting purpose of forestalling statutes to maintain integrity of early trading markets).
23. Compare infra notes 29-49 and accompanying text (describing corporate bar's removal
of fraudulent corporate managers from corporate profession) with infra notes 115-43 and
accompanying text (describing prior methods of purging fraudulent market traders from trading
profession).
24. Compare infra notes 25-51 and accompanying text (outlining purpose and method
of corporate bar) with infra notes 110-43 and accompanying text (outlining purpose and
objective of medieval statutes prohibiting forestalling).
25. See S. REP. No. 337, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Report]
(articulating goal of providing SEC additional enforcement mechanisms); H.R. RP. No. 616,
101st Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1380 [hereinafter
House Report] (subsequent page references to official H.R. REP.) (same).
1992]
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authority prevented the SEC from seeking a remedy commensurate with the
egregiousness of many of the alleged violations, and that the SEC's primary
enforcement measures-injunctions and administrative proceedings-did not
sufficiently deter potential violators of the securities laws. 26 More impor-
tantly, the Remedies Act attempts to address the perception of diminished
investor confidence in the securities markets following the Wall Street
Scandal cases of the 1980s. 27 According to Congress, a strong enforcement
program is essential to investor confidence in the integrity, fairness and
efficiency of the securities markets.
28
One mechanism included by Congress in the Remedies Act to restore
public confidence in the securities markets is the corporate bar provisions
of the Remedies Act. Sections 101 and 201 of the Remedies Act, codified,
respectively, as section 20(e)29 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 0
and section 21(d)(2) 3" of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
26. See Senate Report, supra note 25, at 2 (discussing previous lack of adequate
enforcement remedies); House Report, supra note 25, at 14 (discussing need for increased
flexibility in enforcement); Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Hardball! The SEC's New Arsenal of
Enforcement Weapons, 47 Bus. LAW. 33, 33 (1991) (discussing motivations behind Remedies
Act).
27. See Senate Report, supra note 25, at 2 (noting rise by over 260% of securities
investors' complaints to SEC during 1980s). According to the Senate Report:
Potential law violators have been lured by the prospects of enormous profits, in
situations where the risk of detection by financial regulators has appeared small.
Recent years have witnessed the biggest insider trading scandals in history, widespread
incidences of fraudulent financial reporting by financial institutions and other cor-
porations, illegal activity in connection with tender offers, billions of dollars of
losses to small investors as a result of illegal activity in the "penny stock" market,
market manipulation and other illegal trading activity, and fraudulent and misleading
disclosures in the sale of securities.
Id.; House Report, supra note 25, at 14 (noting rise of complaints during 1980s); William R.
McLucas et al., SEC Enforcement: A Look at the Current Program and Some Thoughts
About the 1990s, 46 Bus. LAW. 797, 798-803, 825 (1991) (noting SEC's increased awareness
of Wall Street scandals of 1980s); James Treadway, Looking for the Perfect Enforcement
Remedy: Old Wine in New Bottles or: Have I Seen This Movie Before?, 48 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 859, 860-61 (1991) (discussing SEC's previous inability to handle flagrant violators of
securities laws).
28. See Senate Report, supra note 25, at 2 (discussing importance of investor confidence
to securities markets); House Report, supra note 25, at 14 (same).
29. The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) § 20(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77t(e) (West Supp.
1992). Section 20(e) provides:
In any proceeding under subsection (b) of this section, the court may prohibit,
conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as it
shall determine, any person who violated section 17(a)(l) of this title from acting as
an officer or director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant
to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or that is required to file
reports pursuant to section 15(d) of such Act if the person's conduct demonstrates
substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such issuer.
Id.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
31. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) § 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C.A.
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Act), 2 constitute the corporate bar provisions of the Remedies Act.3 3 The
corporate bar provisions expressly authorize the federal courts to bar or
suspend any individual from serving as either an officer or director of any
corporation with a class of securities registered pursuant to section 1234 of
the Exchange Act or, alternatively, any corporation required to file reports
under section 15(d)35 of the Exchange Act. 36 Also, the corporate bar requires
the SEC to show that the individual violated either of two scienter-based
antifraud provisions-section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act 37 or section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act 38-or the rules or regulations promulgated pursuant to
section 10(b). 39 Additionally, the SEC must prove that the person's conduct
demonstrates "substantial unfitness" to serve as an officer or director of a
corporation. 40 Finally, the bar imposed may be conditional or unconditional
§ 78u(d)(2) (West Supp. 1992). Section 21(d)(2) provides:
In any proceeding under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the court may prohibit,
conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as it
shall determine, any person who violated section 10(b) of this title or the rules or
regulations thereunder from acting as an officer or director of any issuer that has
a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this title or that is required
to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title if the person's conduct
demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such
issuer.
Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1988).
33. See generally Ferrara et al., supra note 26 (outlining provisions of Remedies Act);
Dixie L. Johnson, New Remedies and Responsibilities for the SEC, 11 Bus. LAw. UPDATE 7
(Mar.Apr. 1991) (same); Allan A. Martin et al., SEC Enforcement Powers and Remedies Are
Greatly Expanded, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 19 (1991) (same); McLucas et al., supra note 27 (same);
John Sturc et al., The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
24 SEC. & COMMODrrrEs REG. 79 (1991) (same); Treadway, supra note 27 (same).
34. Exchange Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1988).
35. Exchange Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1988).
36. Securities Act § 20(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77t(e) (West Supp. 1992); Exchange Act §
21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2) (West Supp. 1992). Note the language of sections 20(e) and
21(d)(2) is broad enough to permit the SEC to seek a bar against an individual who was not
an officer or director of a corporation at the time of their fraudulent activity. See House
Report, supra note 25, at 27 (noting corporate bar is not limited to cases involving corporate
officers or directors).
37. Securities Act § 17(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a)(1) (1988).
38. Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
39. Securities Act § 20(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77t(e) (West Supp. 1992); Exchange Act §
21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
40. See Ferrara et al., supra note 26, at 67 (criticizing vagueness of "substantial unfitness"
standard); see also Senate Report, supra note 25, at 21 (suggesting permanent bar is particularly
appropriate for egregious violations or recidivists).
Interestingly, British law also permits courts to disqualify certain persons from service as
directors of companies. See Jayne W. Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act
of 1989: Disenfranchising Shareholders in Order to Protect Them, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv.
32, 74-76 (1989) (discussing Britain's Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986). The
Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986 obliges British courts to disqualify directors
of an insolvent company if the director manifests conduct "unfit to be concerned in the
management of a company." Id.; see also Douglas M. Branson, Countertrends in Corporation
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and may be either permanent or for whatever period of time the court
determines is proper.
4'
Despite Congress' belief that federal courts already possessed the au-
thority to order corporate bars pursuant to the courts' inherent equitable
powers to grant ancillary relief, 42 Congress believed that providing courts
with express statutory authority to bar an individual from fiduciary cor-
porate service in cases of deliberate fraudulent conduct would best effectuate
Congress' purpose of restoring public confidence in the public markets.
43
Although Congress noted that the corporate bar remedy represents a poten-
tially severe sanction on individual misconduct," Congress nonetheless de-
termined that individuals demonstrating a blatant disregard for the




By granting courts the power to remove certain corporate executives
from office, the corporate bar admittedly intrudes upon the traditional right
Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law Reform, and Principles
of Corporate Governance and Structure, 68 MiNN. L. Rav. 53, 85-87 (discussing disqualification
of British company directors).
41. Securities Act § 20(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77t(e) (West Supp. 1992); Exchange Act §
21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
42. See Senate Report, supra note 25, at 3, 8, 22 (noting federal courts' power to fashion
equitable relief to effectuate purposes of securities laws); House Report, supra note 25, at 27
(same); David S. Ruder, Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement Practices, 85 Nw.
U. L. REv. 607, 611-12 (1991) (noting Remedies Act merely clarifies courts' power to bar
wrongdoers from acting as managers of public companies); see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964) (holding courts may provide all relief necessary under Exchange
Act for protection of investors); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 284-91
(1940) (outlining general scope of ancillary relief); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200-01 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985) (describing courts' power to order all equitable
relief necessary under circumstances).
Prior to the Remedies Act, courts employed a limited version of the corporate bar remedy
in a number of cases pursuant to consent decrees. See Barnard, supra note 40, at 54 n.158
(listing cases in which SEC negotiated consensual bar orders). In addition, in one litigated
case prior to the Remedies Act a court ordered a corporate bar. SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc.,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,501 (D. Ariz. 1974).
See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study
in Federal Remedies, 67 MmIN. L. REv. 865 (1983) (surveying history and practice of ancillary
relief in federal securities law); James R. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement
Suits, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1779 (1976) (examining appropriateness of imposing ancillary relief);
Arthur F. Matthews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunction
Actions, 31 Bus. LAw. 1323 (1976) (reviewing securities cases settled on terms affecting
selection of corporate officers or directors); James Treadway, SEC Enforcement Techniques:
Expanding and Exotic Forms of Ancillary Relief, 32 WASH. & LEE L. R'v. 637 (1975)
(examining development of novel forms of ancillary relief).
43. See House Report, supra note 25, at 14, 27 (noting Congress' hope that providing
courts with express authority to impose corporate bar might remove any doubts as to availability
of such relief).
44. See Senate Report, supra note 25, at 21 (noting severity of corporate bar remedy).
45. See id. (describing congressional justifications behind corporate bar remedy).
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of a company's shareholders to select whomever they wish as fiduciaries. 6
However, Congress recognized that in many cases of insider trading the
corporate shareholders may directly benefit from the wrongdoing and,
therefore, will have little economic incentive to vote out the offending
executive. 47 Accordingly, the corporate bar demonstrates the willingness of
Congress to define a corporation's objectives in terms broader than the
mere interests of the corporation's shareholders." By authorizing courts to
purge the markets of those officers and directors of leading corporations
whose fraudulent inclinations tend to undermine the integrity of the nation's
securities markets, the corporate bar provisions of the Remedies Act attempt
to hold corporations responsive to nonshareholder constituencies-most
notably the general public.
49
By protecting noninvestor interests through social control, the corporate
bar creates an incongruity with the purely internal perspective characteristic
of private corporations since the nineteenth century.50 If the corporate bar
represents a willingness of Congress to intervene on behalf of the public in
the internal endeavors of private corporations, the corporate bar arguably
may question whether the twentieth-century shareholder-centered conception
of the corporation has been too narrowly conceived.5 In many ways the
corporate bar could represent a preliminary manifestation of an increasing
desire by the populace at large to reconsider the balance of power between
the corporation and society.
II. THE CORPORATION AND SOCIETY
That society at large determines the nature of corporateness derives
from the underlying theoretical foundations of the corporation. The germ
of the corporate idea is not indigenous to any one person or nation.5 2
46. See MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT ANN. § 7.28 (1992 Supp.) (providing shareholders
with broad authority to elect corporate directors).
47. See Senate Report, supra note 25, at 22 (noting possibility shareholders may directly
benefit from managerial wrongdoing).
48. See House Report, supra note 25, at 27 (noting Congress' desire to protect public
investors).
49. See id. (noting broader public interests are involved when actions of violator under-
mine integrity of markets).
50. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (describing general freedom of private
corporations from direct governmental intervention).
51. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (describing twentieth-century conception
of private corporation).
52. See Robert L. Raymond, The Genesis of the Corporation, 19 HAv. L. REv. 350,
353 (1906) (stating "[n]o philosopher, statesman, or lawyer sat down, cogitated, and said, 'It
would be convenient to give several persons acting together certain attributes and call them a
corporation."'); cf. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STrDims IN THE LAw OF CORPORATION FINANCE 3
(1928) [hereinafter BERLE, FNANCE] (stating corporate idea derived from Roman law); BISHOP
C. HuNT, THE DEvELoPsrr oF THE BusNuss CORPORATION IN ENaLAND 1800-1867 3 (1936)
(attributing idea of "juristic person" to Roman lawyers); HENRY 0. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON
TH LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 6 (5th ed. 1905) (noting early common law of corporations
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Rather, the genesis lies in the elemental process of thinking of several
persons acting together as one-a single collective or group. 3 The existence
of collectives, such as clans, families, churches, athletic teams, fraternal
organizations, political parties or nations, is common to primary stages of
human development and thought.14 Although natural human beings compose
these collectives, the state"5 often has awarded certain of these collectives
corporate effect separate and distinct from their constituent human mem-
bers.16 As the state does not "create" a human being, it is questionable
whether the state can "create" an entity or corporation.5 7 The positive law
borrowed largely from Roman law); 1 THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PRIvATE CORPORATIONS 43-44 (1888) (tracing corporate idea to Greek civilizations); Jouett,
supra note 16, at 384-85 (arguing Roman origins of corporation); Samuel Williston, History
of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARv. L. REV. 105, 106 (1888) (noting
Blackstone attributed honor of originating corporate idea to Romans). But see CARR, supra
note 8, at 133-34 (suggesting early forms of English corporateness were native English product
and noting minimal Roman influence); JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE Busnss
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 1-9 (1970) (arguing despite
corporation's English antecedents, corporate law in United States is uniquely homegrown
product); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Historical Inheritance of American Corporations, in THE PowERS
AND DuTrs OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 192 (Edmond N. Cahn ed., 1950) [hereinafter Berle,
Inheritance] (arguing American corporation descended directly from England); Arthur W.
Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality (pt. 1), 24 HARv. L. REv. 253, 255 (1911) (arguing Roman
law accorded slight consideration to "what we call corporations"); Raymond, supra, at 354
(pointing out corporation existed in England before England received Roman law books).
53. See 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 471 (1895) (arguing history of corporations is "form of thought" rather than "rule of
law"); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J.
655, 673 (1926) (describing group idea of corporations). According to Dewey:
When a body of twenty or two thousand or two hundred thousand men bind
themselves together to act in a particular way for some common purpose, they create
a body which by no fiction of law but by the very nature of things, differs from
the individuals of whom it is composed.
Id.; Harold J. Laski, The Early History of the Corporation in England, 30 HARv. L. REV.
561, 581 (1917) (suggesting essence of corporateness lies in thinking of group of men as one);
Raymond, supra note 52, at 350 (arguing nature of corporation is merely mode of thought).
54. See VICTOR MoRAwETz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 2-3 (2d
ed. 1886) (suggesting conception of collective entities occurs at earliest stages of human
development); see also Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HAKv. L. REV.
404, 404 (1916) (noting man's associative nature).
55. See Padover, supra note 5, at 267 (defining state as human organization, set up by
its citizens, for performance of certain minimum tasks necessary for civilized existence).
56. See W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21 LAW
Q. REv. 365, 366 (1905) (noting corporation is legally distinct from its members); Laski, supra
note 53, at 563-68 (suggesting corporate character occurs when transition from natural collec-
tivism to abstract entities with identity separate from constituent members occurs); Laski,
supra note 54, at 407-08, 424 (discussing fiction denying partnership entities corporate status);
Pollock, supra note 8, at 231 (noting law considers corporation to be distinct from its
members). But see H. Ke Chin Wang, The Corporate Entity Concept (or Fiction Theory) in
the Year Book Period (pt. 1), 58 LAW Q. R~v. 498, 500-01 (1942) (arguing in early medieval
periods corporations were not considered distinct from human components).
57. See Machen, supra note 52, at 259-61 (arguing law merely recognizes and gives legal
effect to preexisting corporate entities).
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of the state does, however, assign a bundle of capacities and duties to
certain preexisting groups just as it assigns rights and obligations to certain
humans. 5 The state thereby recognizes or refuses to recognize and give legal
effect to that group or person'.
59
In many ways, the jural bundle of rights and capacities known as the
corporation resembles a legal person.60 Accordingly, society has often anal-
ogized groups with persons because of the resemblance of their respective
capacities. 61 At certain points in history the characteristics accorded such
''group persons" more resemble those possessed by human persons than at
other times. 62 Just as the state may entitle some humans to different sets
of rights and duties than other humans, 63 the state likewise accords certain
group persons different attributes than other group persons.6 Additionally,
58. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 53, at 469 (describing corporate collectives as
"subjects of rights and duties"); Berle, Inheritance, supra note 52, at 192 (noting evidence
supports idea that state assumes control of preexisting collectivities rather than creating them);
Heinz Lubasz, The Corporate Borough in the Common Law of the Late Year-Book Period,
80 LAw Q. RIv. 228, 232 (1964) (arguing English kings prescribed preexisting English boroughs
with corporate capacity); Machen, supra note 52, at 259-61 (suggesting law instills preexisting
groups with corporate capacities).
59. See Brown, supra note 56, at 372 (arguing corporation is not physical reality but
merely legal conception); Dewey, supra note 53, at 677 (describing how corporate existence
depends on positive state sanction); Laski, supra note 54, at 405 (noting state confers rights
and duties both on corporations and persons). Laski satirically points out that a group of men
absent state sanction do not become one corporate person when they associate to do business
any more than ten horses become one animal when they draw the same cart. Id. at 406.
60. See 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATSE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATiONs 13 (Garland
Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1793) (stating "[a] corporation.., or body incorporate, is a collection
of many individuals, united into one body, under a special denomination, having perpetual
succession under an artificial form, and vested, by the policy of the law, with the capacity of
acting, in several respects, as an individual .... .") (emphasis in original); POLLOCK & MAr-
LAND, supra note 53, at 471-76 (discussing "anthropomorphic" picture of corporation); Brown,
supra note 56, at 367 (suggesting corporations are legal persons); see generally Charles S.
Lobingier, The Natural History of the Private Artificial Person: A Comparative Study in
Corporate Origins, 13 TirL. L. REv. 40 (1938) (tracing origins of fictitious corporate person
concept).
61. See Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 CoLum. L. REv.
643, 652-55 (1932) (arguing personifying corporation functions is device of convenience and
easy reference).
62. See Laski, supra note 54, at 404, 413 (noting tendency since nineteenth century for
courts increasingly to approximate position of corporation to that of individual); infra notes
162-75 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth-century cases according corporations
constitutional personhood).
63. See Brown, supra note 56, at 367 (suggesting certain societies considered slaves human
beings but not legal persons); Machen, supra note 52, at 264 (noting antebellum society
accorded southern slaves different rights and capacities than their respective masters).
64. See Machen, supra note 52, at 260-61 (noting state recognizes certain groups as
corporations while refusing to extend corporate attributes to physically similar groups such as
partnerships); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality (pt. 2), 24 HARv. L. R-v. 347,
350 (1911) (noting distinctions between corporations and partnerships rest on positive law
rather than upon natural differences). Additionally, an identical set of persons may concurrently
possess multiple legal capacities and functions. For instance, society may award legal recognition
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in times of social or economic growth and expansion, such as the 1980s,
society traditionally takes a more facilitative view toward commercial cor-
porations, while in periods of uncertainty or decline society typically curtails
corporate autonomy. 6s The logical extension of these propositions is that a
corporation is nothing more and nothing less than what certain societal
representatives, presumably reflecting the broader beliefs of society, want it
to be.6
Conventional thought and doctrine regarding corporations elect to utilize
a rigid dichotomy between so-called "public" corporations and "private"
corporations as a means of structuring society's analysis of a corporation's
proper objectives and functions.67 On the one hand, society generally con-
to one group of people as both a political community and an economic corporation. See
Lubasz, supra note 58, at 241-42 (describing incorporation as investiture of added capacities
rather than creation of new entities).
65. See I JOHN P. DAVIS, A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT BUSINESS
COMBINATIONS AND OF THEm RELATION TO THE AUTHoRITY OF THE STATE 88-91, 158-59 (1905)
(noting how society is more enabling towards corporations at certain times than others and
that in times of corporate growth society recognizes the public function served by promoting
facilitative economic policies).
66. See Dewey, supra note 53, at 656 (suggesting both corporate and natural persons
are "right-and-duty-bearing unit[s]"). Dewey argues the substantive content of the legal
"person" depends on what rights and duties the law at any one time attributes to it. Id. at
655-56, 659. Dewey then notes throughout history society continually has evolved the meaning
of the juristic "person." Id. at 665; see also BORK, supra note 2, at 10 (discussing how law
both reflects and shapes societal trends).
67. See 2 DAVIs, supra note 65, at 248-80 (describing modem corporations divided
between public and private corporations); HURST, supra note 52, at 13-115 (1970) (describing
development of distinction between public and private corporations); Frug, supra note 6, at
1099-1100 (noting nineteenth-century division of corporations into public and private spheres);
Thomas K. McCraw, The Public and Private Spheres in Historical Perspective, in PUBuC-
PRIVATE PATERSmP: NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR MEETING SOCIAL NEEDS 38-47 (Harvey Brooks
et al. eds., 1984) (tracing history of separation of public and private spheres); Millon, supra
note 8, at 201-03 (noting nineteenth-century division of corporation into separate spheres);
Warren J. Samuels, The Idea of the Corporation as a Person: On the Normative Significance
of Judicial Language, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIIrrY 119-20
(Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) (noting phenomenon of both public and
private corporations); Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do
Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1444 (1982) (noting "traditional
distinctions" between public and private corporate activities); Bruce Wyman, The Law of the
Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HARv. L. REv. 156, 156 (1903) (arguing
"[t]he distinction between the private callings-the rule-and the public callings-the excep-
tion-is the most consequential division in the law governing our business relations."); see
also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 340 (6th ed. 1990) (stating distinction between public and
private corporations rests on governmental purpose of public corporations); Herbert Hoven-
kamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEo. L.J. 1593, 1638 (1988)
(indicating distinction between public and private corporations depends on nature of corporate
activity).
The very existence of texts written exclusively about public or private corporations further
demonstrates this division. See, e.g., JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPOATIONS AGGREGATE (11th ed. 1882) (private); CHARLES FISK BEACH,
JR., COmMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1891) (private); JOHN DILLON,
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siders public corporations, such as cities or utilities, to be identified with
and dominated by the government, founded for unselfish, public purposes,
and concerned with a general array of societal functions.68 Three components
characterize society's conventional thinking on public corporations: A direct
subjection to governmental intervention;69 an external perspective that ex-
plicitly regards relations between the corporation and society;70 and a
tempered profit motive. 7' These aspects combine to focus the attention of
public corporations on larger societal objectives; that is, these characteristics
endow the public corporation with a "public dimension."
On the other hand, society normally considers private corporations, the
predominant twentieth-century conception of corporateness, to be insulated
from direct governmental domination, unresponsive to public concerns or
input, and geared primarily toward furthering shareholder interests. 72 As
with public corporations, three elements characterize society's definition of
private corporations: A limited exposure to governmental intervention;73 a
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNIC'AL CORPORATIONS (1872) (public); CHARLES B. ELUOT, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1900) (private); GEORGE W. FELD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1877) (private); WILLIAM M. FLETCHER,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (penn. ed. 1990) (private);
EuGENE McQumILN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1st ed. 1911)
(public); VICTOR MORAwETz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed.
1886) (private); OSCAR L. POND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC UTILTIES (4th ed. 1932)
(public); ROBERT S. STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1949)
(private); HENRY 0. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (5th ed.
1905) (private); THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS OTHER
THAN MUNICMAL (1888) (private); BRUCE WYmAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS (1911)
(public).
68. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 668-69
(1819) (Story, J., concurring) (defining public corporations as those "exist[ing] for public
political purposes only, such as towns, cities, parishes, and counties; . .. public corporations
are such only as are founded by the government, for public purposes, where the whole interests
belong also to the government."); 2 JAMEs KENT, COmmENTAm ON AMERICAN LAW 275 (3d
ed. 1836) (defining public corporations to be those "created by the government for political
purposes, as counties, cities, towns and villages; they are invested with subordinate legislative
powers to be exercised for local purposes connected with the public good, and such powers
are subject to the control of the legislature of the state."); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 526-31 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing nunicipal corporation in
America); Frug, supra note 6, at 1112 (noting nineteenth-century definitions of municipal
corporations remain valid today).
69. See Stone, supra note 67, at 1453, 1462 (noting traditional susceptibility of public
entities to governmental intervention).
70. See Millon, supra note 8, at 201 (noting public corporation's explicit regard to
relations between corporation and society at large).
71. See Stone, slipra note 67, at 1464 (noting motive of public corporations may lean
toward providing public services rather than maximizing profits).
72. See David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law, 45 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 903, 903, 911-18 (1988) (outlining modem understanding of corporation);
Millon, supra note 8, at 203, 211-16, 220-31 (articulating view of modem corporation); Coates,
supra note 8, at 819-35, 873 (describing predominant twentieth-century conception of corpo-
ration).
73. See Stone, supra note 67, at 1487-91 (describing general freedom of private corpo-
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purely internal focus unresponsive to societal needs;74 and a single-minded
dedication to the maximization of shareholder welfare. 75 In the aggregate,
these components highlight private corporations' focus on the financial
betterment of the corporation's investors. In other words, the components
supply the private corporation with a "private dimension." The conventional
tendency to distinguish between public and private corporations provides an
overarching framework for corporate doctrine to categorize the appropriate
priorities and attributes of twentieth-century corporations.
76
While modern law, thought and parlance reflect this divided conception
of the corporation, the notion that business is of two distinct classes, public
and private, is an historical anomaly. 77 In contrast to today's assumption
ration from direct intervention); see also infra notes 162-75 and accompanying text (noting
development of constitutional doctrine allowing corporations to invoke many of individual
restraints on governmental power under Constitution).
74. See RcaC.HAD A. POSNER, EcONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAw 369-72 (3d ed. 1986) (describing
internal perspective); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law,
26 J. L. & EcoN. 395, 401 (1983) (arguing thrust of corporate law concerns intracorporate
contractual relations); Arleen Liebowitz, Are Corporations Undemocratic, Private Minigovern-
ments?, in THE ATTACK ON CORPOATE AMERICA 21-25 (M. Johnson ed., 1978) (describing
internal corporate electoral processes); Millon, supra note 72, at 911-18 (noting private
corporation's general focus on internal relations between management and shareholders);
Millon, supra note 8, at 201-02 (same).
75. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the
Expense of Shareholder Gain-A Survey of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law,
13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7, 8 (1988) (stating "[t]he bedrock principle of U.S. corporate law remains
that maximization of shareholder value is the polestar for managerial decisionmaking"); Cary,
supra note 16, at 684 (suggesting revenue raising remains only public policy in Delaware
corporate law); Dodd, Trustees, supra note 17, at 1146-47 (describing traditional view of
corporations as "association of stockholders formed for their private gain and to be managed
by its board of directors solely with that end in view"); Millon, supra note 72, at 917-18
(describing "shareholder primacy principle" as fundamental principle of private corporations).
The Michigan Supreme Court articulated the classic formulation of the shareholder
primacy principle:
A business corporation is organized and carried on'primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end,
and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to
the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other
purposes.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
76. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 68, at 526 (stating generally society considers private
corporations "freer" while public corporations thought to be "closely regulated" and "exten-
sively controlled"); Dodd, Trustees, supra note 17, at 1152-53 (suggesting public opinion does
not consider private corporations to have obligations to community); see generally Stone, supra
note 67, (outlining influence of public/private distinction in shaping corporate conduct).
77. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 302 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(arguing "[tihe notion of a distinct category of business 'affected with a public interest,'
employing property 'devoted to a public use' rests upon historical error."); DAvis, supra note
65, at 31 (arguing "[t]he private corporation pure and simple is a product of social, political
and industrial conditions largely peculiar to nineteenth century" and that "private corporation"
is contradiction in terms); EDwiN M. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPOATONS UNTL 1860
14 (1954) (stating "[t]he division of business corporation law into the two categories of public
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of a structured dichotomy in the character of corporations, previous societies
generally considered all entities with corporate status to possess similar legal
rights and obligations. 78 Prior to the nineteenth century, both a corporation's
public and private dimensions existed concurrently in a dynamic, interde-
pendent relationship.7 9 Corporations then oscillated on a continuum between
their dual attributes of social control and private freedom. 0 At certain
points in time society emphasized social control; in other eras society
facilitated a corporation's private freedom."' But at no time prior to the
nineteenth century did society consider, much less permit, any corporation
to exist absent either dimension-at least not for long.8 2
By not allowing corporations to dedicate themselves single-mindedly to
private welfare, previous societies maintained a degree of social control over
corporations by curbing corporate activity perceived to be disruptive of
broader societal objectives. 3 The corporate bar may represent a willingness
and private law is one that would probably have seemed strange to eighteenth-century American
lawyers and judges. The proposition that corporations are of two kinds, public and private,
... was one that did not become established in American case law until some years after the
beginning of the nineteenth century."); Edward A. Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARv.
L. REv. 135, 158 (1914) (arguing under common law phrase "private business" was contra-
diction in terms); Dodd, Trustees, supra note 17, at 1148 n.7 (asserting until modem times
society regarded all business publicly carried on as public in character); Frug, supra note 6,
at 1082 (arguing before nineteenth century no distinction between public or private corporations
existed in England or America). Neither Blackstone nor Stewart Kyd, who authored the first
treatise on corporations in 1793, noted the development of distinct public and private categories
of corporations. Id. at 1095; Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation With Public Interest, 39 YALE
L.J. 1089, 1094 (1930) (noting "[i]n Lord Hale's time ... all activity comprehended under
what today we call business was public .... "); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins
of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. EcoN. HIST. 1, 19-20 (1945) (stating differentiation
between public and private corporations was completely unknown before 1800); Michael
Barzelay & Rogers M. Smith, The One Best System? A Political Analysis of Neoclassical
Institutionalist Perspectives on the Modern Corporation, in CORPORATIONS AND SocmTY: POWER
AND RasPoNsmnrrY 90 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) (suggesting term
private corporation might have struck eighteenth-century observers as oxymoron); Williston,
supra note 52, at 105 (noting business and municipal corporations historically classed together);
cf. BERLE, FINANCE, supra note 52, at 7-8 (describing medieval trade guild as "private
association for private purposes").
78. See POLLOCK & MAr.AN, supra note 53, at 478 (noting early medieval law did not
divide corporations into various kinds); FRIEDMAN, supra note 68, at 526 (stating "[b]efore
Blackstone's day, there was a 'law of corporations' which covered all chartered entities. Public
and private, profit and nonprofit companies-towns, churches, and businesses-all fit in one
legal bag."); Frug, supra note 6, at 1082 (noting prior to nineteenth century no legal distinctions
existed between public and private corporations).
79. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (describing dual nature of previous
corporations).
80. See infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text (discussing early corporate organiza-
tions' simultaneous freedom from and subjection to social control).
81. See infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text (discussing previous corporations' ebb
and flow between poles of private freedom and social control).
82. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (noting struggle of earlier societies to
maintain equilibrium between levels of private freedom and social control).
83. See infra notes 102-43 and accompanying text (describing efforts of previous societies
to check corporate activity harmful of public welfare).
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of contemporary society to reject the purely internal perspective of present
corporate law in favor of an approach that addresses important questions
about the proper relationship between the corporation and society. If so,
in making corporations responsive to broader societal constituencies, the
corporate bar parallels an earlier vision of the corporation that once
dominated thinking on these matters-a vision that displayed counterbal-
anced traits of public control and private freedom.
III. AN EARLIER CONCEPTION OF CORPORAnONS
While one might appropriately begin an examination of corporate history
earlier,"5 the logical point at which to begin is the concurrent emergence of
the English towns and the merchant trade guilds in the eleventh century.
s6
Commentators generally consider these groups to be the predecessors of
current corporations.
8 7
The medieval town coalesced largely on account of the proximity of its
residents and as a group defense mechanism against outsiders." Once
population began to increase, the market developed within towns as inhab-
itants traded among themselves as well as with others.8 9 Like-minded mer-
chants soon sought to enhance their economic interests by organizing
merchant guilds to regulate the conduct of burgeoning local trade.9
84. See infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text (describing dual nature of earlier
corporations).
85. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing possible Roman origin of
corporate idea).
86. See DAVIS, supra note 65, at 149 (noting appearance of merchant guild at end of
eleventh century); Frug, supra note 6, at 1080 (noting "reemergence" of cities in eleventh
century).
87. See BERLE, FINANCE, supra note 52, at 6-7 (discussing English cities and guilds as
sources of corporation); CARR supra note 8, at 134-49 (discussing corporate features of English
borough); DAVIS, supra note 65, at 130-244 (noting emergence of corporation from guilds);
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 53, at 478 (noting that as early as eleventh century boroughs
were on their way to becoming corporations); Laski, supra note 53, at 581 (connecting
corporateness of English trading companies to borough); Lubasz, supra note 58, at 230-43
(discussing boroughs' incidents of corporateness). Lubasz argues the borough did not become
"corporate" until the close of the fifteenth century. Id. at 230.; see also Raymond, supra
note 52, at 354-65 (examining borough and guild groups as predecessors to corporation);
Williston, supra note 52, at 107-08 (stating earliest corporate associations in England were
guilds and municipal organizations).
88. See BERLE, FINANCE, supra note 52, at 6 (noting coalescing of medieval town as
defense mechanism); CAm supra note 8, at 134 (same); Frug, supra note 6, at 1083 (same);
Raymond, supra note 52, at 355 (elaborating proximity motivation). For a more thorough
discussion of medieval towns see generally: HENRI PIRENNE, MEDiEVAL CITrS: THEIR ORIGIs
AND THE REVIVAL OF TADE (1925); HENRI PIRENNE, EcoNoMIc AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF
MEDIEVAL EUROPE (I.E. Clegg trans., 1936); COLIN PLATT, THE ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TowN
(1976); CARL STEPHENSON, BOROUGH AND TowN: A STUDY OF URBAN ORIGINs IN ENGLAND
(1933).
89. See CARR, supra note 8, at 134 (noting development of town as marketing center);
Raymond, supra note 52, at 355 (noting development of trade).




The success of the merchant guilds depended on the fate of their
respective towns.9' Just as the formation of guilds provided the means for
associations of merchants to obtain economic power and autonomy, the
structure of towns provided their inhabitants the bargaining power to seek
relief from feudal bondage and acquire a semblance of self-government. 9
Although town and guild were distinct entities, they shared an identity of
interests in that protecting the city's autonomy preserved the merchant's
way of life.93 Merchants recognized that city autonomy meant the freedom
to pursue their private economic interests largely on terms defined by the
merchant guilds themselves.Y An harmonious identity existed between the
interests of the merchants and the interests of the town as a whole; the
merchants contributed to town functions and the town sustained the mer-
chants. 95
By organizing and regulating the conduct of trade within isolated towns
in a time of localized trade and weak national government, the guilds
performed an essential public function.9 Recognizing the important, bene-
ficial services provided by the guilds, society granted the guilds a large
degree of private freedom. Without seeking town approval the guilds elected
officers; regulated labor conditions, wages and prices; protected workers
from exploitation; set standards of quality and workmanship; adopted rules
against unfair competition; punished fraud; maintained courts and compul-
sory systems of arbitration of disputes; and inflicted often severe penalties
on those who transgressed the guilds' self-enforced rules.97 This thorough
degree of control of commercial conduct applied equally to all professions
alike, from the innkeeper to the saddler to the ordinary trader.98
91. See CAsR, supra note 8, at 143 (noting guild and town were closely connected but
distinct); DAvis supra note 65, at 159-63 (describing relationship between merchant guild and
town).
92. See Frug, supra note 6, at 1084-86 (noting emergence of town autonomy); Raymond,
supra note 52, at 355-56 (describing impulse for self-government).
93. See Frug, supra note 6, at 1083-87 (describing medieval conception of society in
which individual benefitted by freedom of town).
94. See Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition,
35 YALE L.J. 905, 924 (1926) (noting guild members controlled city governments and town
meetings often convened in guild balls); see also Frug, supra note 6, at 1083 n.99 (stating "the
nest of the medieval town" enabled "the egg of the capitalist cuckoo" to incubate (quoting
LEwIs MuMpoRD, Tim CITY IN HisToRY 411 (1961))).
95. See Frug, supra note 6, at 1083-87 (describing medieval identity of interests between
individual and town). Cf. Daniel Bell, The Corporation and Society in the 1970's, 24 PUB.
INTEREsT 5, 7 (1971) (stating in late twentieth century "[a] feeling has begun to spread in the
country that corporate~performance has made the society uglier, dirtier, trashier, more polluted
and noxious. The sense of identity between the self-interest of the corporation and the public
interest has been replaced by a sense of incongruence.").
96. See Jones, supra note 94, at 922-23 (describing invaluable public services supplied
by guild organizations).
97. See id. at 922-23, 926 (listing "quasi-governmental" powers exercised by guilds).
98. See Adler, supra note 77, at 149-59 (arguing common law did not recognize distinc-
tions between business professions); supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (same).
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As long as these incipient corporate organizations maintained local trade
conditions in a manner consistent with larger societal objectives, the mer-
chant guilds received a large measure of public support and, consequently,
were able to pursue their own interests with virtual complete freedom from
any governmental interference. 99 Society acknowledged the private freedom
of these early corporations as long as the corporate organizations maintained
a relative symmetry between their public and private dimensions.' °0 However,
abuses inevitably developed among the guilds, entrenched in control of local
government and exercising almost plenary authority over economic activ-
ity. 101
In response to perceptions that the guilds had begun to manipulate
prices and hoard profits for the pecuniary benefit of their members, mu-
nicipal authorities gathered forces to check these primitive corporate exces-
ses. 02 The public power of the towns enacted a number of ordinances
curtailing the private freedom of the previously independent guilds. For
instance, town authorities began to elect guild officers, to set prices of
commodities and standards of quality, to require guilds to submit their
bylaws to town officials for approval, and to annul offensive guild ordi-
nances. 03 In some instances town officials, in draconian fashion, simply
dissolved certain of the once well-established and seemingly autonomous
guilds.' 4
National lawmakers later assumed responsibility for checking abuses of
the public welfare by guilds. Following charges that certain guilds had been
acting "for their singular profit and common damage to the people,"
authorities passed a statute in 1437 submitting all guild ordinances to
municipal authorities for approval. 05 Similarly, in response to allegations
that guild members had misappropriated public funds, in 1547 lawmakers
passed another act that confiscated all of the guilds' property and devoted
the property to erect schools and to provide for the poor.' 6 In addition to
99. See DAVIS, supra note 65, at 159 (noting society tended to bestow large degree of
discretion on guilds to pursue their own interests so long as such pursuits coincided with public
interest); HURST, supra note 52, at 4 (describing private profit seeking in early corporations
as incidental return for public functions served by corporations).
100. See DAVIs, supra note 65, at 159 (noting private freedom of guilds was contingent
on their being mindful of public welfare).
101. See Jones, supra note 94, at 927 (noting tendency of autonomous guild members to
abuse their power).
102. See DAVIS, supra note 65, at 242 (stating society regulated guilds "to keep the self-
interest of the gildsmen from overbalancing the interests of society in general"); Jones, supra
note 94, at 928 (noting hostility of common people to guild abuses).
103. See Jones, supra note 94, at 928-29 (describing reassertion of town authority over
guilds); Laski, supra note 53, at 587 (noting sovereign authorities rendered void certain guild
ordinances tending to "their own singular profit and to the common hurt and damage of the
people").
104. See Jones, supra note 94, at 928 (noting lack of hesitancy of town authorities at
times to annul certain offensive guild ordinances).
105. See id. at 928-29 (discussing increasing regulatory powers of towns).
106. See id. at 929 (discussing national regulation of fraudulent guilds).
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seizing guild assets, authorities often held individual members of guilds
proportionately responsible for the debts of the corporate group.'
°7
Enacted in reaction to charges that guild members were enriching
themselves at the expense of the guilds' broader responsibilities to society
at large, these corrective measures manifested a societal inclination to realign
the coinciding public and private priorities of the guilds into a more
beneficial balance. 08 For centuries, whenever our English antecedents per-
ceived that the merchant's unabated pursuit of private profit had offset the
desired balance between business' public and private dimensions, lawmakers
readily reestablished social control over the corporate enterprise.1°9
IV. FoREsTALLNG: A FOREBEAR oF THE BAR?
If the corporate bar represents a readiness of society to rethink its
proper relationship with corporations by restoring a degree of public control,
it is not surprising that Congress chose a mechanism that parallels those
employed in previous centuries to maintain public control over corpora-
tions. °10 One method chosen by earlier societies to remedy a perceived
imbalance between a corporate enterprise's dual attributes of public control
and private freedom involved the regulation of forestalling."' Broadly
defined, acts prohibiting forestalling sought to prevent any practice that
deprived the public of an unrestricted market in which to trade."
2
As today, earlier merchants traded the majority of their wares at
common, public markets." 3 The integrity of these markets depended on
assuring the ability of the common people to buy and sell goods on an
unrestricted basis."14 Officials encouraged merchants to conduct transactions
107. See Wang, supra note 56, at 510-11 (noting society occasionally considered guild
members personally liable for group debts).
108. See 4 W.S. HowswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 375 (1924) (indicating
governmental authorities acted with public approval in suppressing practices harmful to society
at large).
109. See W.S. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31
YAE L.J. 382, 383-85 (1922) (discussing historical necessity of maintaining social control over
corporate organizations). The willingness of English society to subordinate corporate entities
to the state illustrated the Roman maxim of keeping the corporate form "under lock and
key." Id. at 383 (quoting FPEDEic W. MAITIAND, Introduction to OTTo V. GiERKa, PoLrncAL
THroims oF Tm MDDLE AGE xxx (Frederick W. Maitland trans., 1900)).
110. See HoLDswoRzTH, supra note 108, at 379 (predicting society may find it useful to
reassert principle underlying medieval doctrines against market manipulation).
111. See infra notes 112-43 and accompanying text (describing statutes designed to prevent
forestalling).
112. See Jones, supra note 94, at 907 (defining forestalling); see also HowswoRT, supra
note 108, at 375-76 (defining forestalling and similar practices); M. Van Smith, Preventing the
Manipulation of Commodity Futures Markets: To Deliver or Not to Deliver?, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 1569, 1571 n.13 (1981) (same); infra note 118 (same).
113. See Jones, supra note 94, at 906 (describing early trading markets).
114. See id. at 907 (noting need for free flow of trade).
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openly, under the watchful eye of the public."' Authorities were steadfast
in their efforts to regulate practices by overzealous merchants designed to
obstruct this ancient mechanism of market trading."16 Lawmakers custom-
arily coupled the right of merchants to participate in public markets with
the authority of government to control the conduct of the market traders."
7
Known as forestalling, attempts by merchants to corner or manipulate
market prices, particularly in times of famine or pestilence, both undermined
the integrity of the markets and inflated prices available to the public.11 8
The ensuing public acrimony generated a succession of statutes regulating
the practice of forestalling spanning the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries." 9
For example, in the early 1260s England experienced dramatic fluctua-
tions in the prices of necessities resulting in many deaths from starvation. 
2°
In response, King Henry III promulgated a statute in 1266 entitled "A
Statute of the Pillory and Tumbirel, and of the Assize of Bread and Ale,"
which fixed the prices of various commodities and subjected forestallers to
the town pillory.' 2' In 1306 King Edward I oversaw the enactment of a
similar law to punish those whose deceptive practices inflated prices to the
public.'2 Several of the punishments exacted by this 1306 act should appear
115. See DAvis, supra note 65, at 175 (describing requirement that traders should conduct
nearly all transactions openly). The early emphasis on the publicness of business affairs is
consistent with the policy of disclosure underlying modem securities laws. See Louis D.
BRuANDEs, OTIMR PEOPLE'S MoNEY AND How THE BANKERs USE IT 92 (1914) (coining aphorism
"[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants"); see also Dennis W. Carlton & Daneil R.
Fishel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 858 (1983) (arguing prime
objection to insider trading is its tendency to undermine public's confidence in stock markets);
Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock
Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425, 1440 (1967) (same).
116. See Jones, supra note 94, at 907 (noting repeated efforts of authorities to regulate
practices designed to manipulate prices).
117. See Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive Norm of
Intellectual Property Law, 75 MnlN. L. RPv. 875, 890 (1991) (describing public concern for
behavior of early market participants).
118. See DAvis, supra note 65, at 173 (defining forestalling as buying or preempting goods
before they reached the common market); Jones, supra note 94, at 907 (defining forestalling
as obstructing public's access to unrestricted market).
119. See Jones, supra note 94, at 907-20 (surveying numerous statutes attempting to
regulate forestalling).
120. See id. at 907 (describing poor economic conditions).
121. See id. at 907-08 (noting enactment of statute prohibiting forestalling in reaction to
poor economic conditions). The statute defined forestallers as those "that buy anything before
the due hour, or that pass out of towns to meet such things as come to the markets, to the
intent they may sell the same in the town [at a higher price]." Id. at 908; Smith, supra note
112, at 1571 n.12 (describing statute of 1266).
122. See Jones, supra note 94, at 908 (noting passage of 1306 statute). The statute, in
pertinent part, provided:
No forestaller shall be suffered to dwell in any town, who manifestly is an
oppressor of the poor, and a public enemy of the country, who meeting grain, fish,
herring, or other things coming by land or by water to be sold, doth hasten to buy
them before another; thirsting after wicked gain .... and by that means goeth about
to sell the said things much dearer than he that brought them; ... and by such
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familiar to those acquainted with today's securities laws: Forfeiture of those
goods purchased prior to their entrance into the general market for the first
offense, the pillory for the second offense, imprisonment and fine for the
third offense, and banishment for the fourth.' 3 A chronicler of the time,
in telling language, indicated how fierce public outrage was toward mer-
chants whose avaricious pursuit of unreasonable profits led them to attempts
at forestalling:
Forestallers, ... deserve to be reckoned amongst the number of
oppresors of the common good and public weal of the realm, for
they do endeavor to enrich themselves by the impoverishment of
others, .... They have been exclaimed upon and condemned in
parliament from one generation to another, . .. especially by the
statute [of Edward I] .... a canker, a moth, and a gnawing worm,
that daily wasteth the commonwealth; and the act and name of a
forestaller was so odious in that time, that it was. moved in parlia-
ment to have had it established by law, that a forestaller should be
baited out of the town "where he dwelt by dogs, and whipped
forth with whips."''
After the Black Death reached England in 1348, Parliament enacted a
statute punishing certain forestallers by death.'2 Following a period of
excessive prices in the sixteenth century, lawmakers crafted another series
of statutes designed to prevent manipulation of the markets through the
control or enhancement of prices.'2 In 1550 Parliament unanimously passed
the statute of Edward IV, the principal medieval statute against forestall-
ing. 2 7 High prices for necessities similarly prevailed in the early 1600s.'2
Intense popular feeling against the manipulative marketing methods of
merchants compelled the English sovereigns to promote another round of
measures designed to reassert a degree of social control to restore public
confidence in market integrity. 2 9 For example, in 1618 the government
increased its control of the markets by vesting in local officials broad powers
craft and subtility deceiveth a whole town and country.
Id.
123. See id. at 908 (describing penalties for forestalling).
124. See id. at 908-09 (describing contemporary public sentiment toward forestallers).
125. See id. at 909 (describing social conditions during plague and statute of 1353 punishing
forestalling by death); Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J.
34, 38 n.13 (1937) (noting passage of 1353 statute).
126. See Jones, supra note 94, at 912-15 (relating that statutes prohibiting forestalling
typically followed periods of public discontent); see also HowswoRaH, supra note 108, at 376
(noting society tended to relax restrictions against forestalling in prosperous times).
127. See Jones, supra note 94, at 914 (describing passage and provisions of 1550 statute);
Smith, supra note 112, at 1571 n.13 (same). Smith also argues the Commodity Exchange Act
of 1922 embodies the spirit of the ancient acts against forestalling. Id.
128. See Jones, supra note 94, at 916-17 (noting excessive prices in 1600s).
129. See id. (discussing passage of acts against forestalling as response to bitter popular
sentiment against cornering of public markets).
100919921
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:987
to regulate market offenses. 130 The duties of these local officials included
searching for and "punish[ing] all Forestallers .... who by their inordinate
desire of gaine do enhance the prices of all things vendible."'' By contrast,
societal and corporate prosperity reigned in early eighteenth-century Eng-
land.12 As society perceived corporate participants were being mindful of
both their public and private dimensions, the state had no need for restrictive
legislation protecting the interests of the public.'33 Consequently, to facilitate
the economy lawmakers repealed many of the regulatory statutes.'3 How-
ever, by the mid-1700s fluctuating prices induced widespread speculation
and revived the public perception that the volatile market resulted from
manipulative market practices.' 35 Yet again the public clamored for Parlia-
ment to curtail those whose deceptive practices undermined the integrity of
the markets. 3 6 Accordingly, in 1766 the government issued a proclamation
reinstating the laws against forestalling.
3 7
Finally, as the late eighteenth-century economic order of Adam Smith,
which believed that unregulated private freedom contributed to societal
welfare, became a political reality, the medieval practice of intrusive gov-
ernmental regulation of the marketplace passed into disuse. 3 g A series of
parliamentary acts expressly repealed the prohibitions against forestalling.'39
Parliament's repeal of these prohibitive statutes rejected the need for social
control of manipulative market practices and set the stage for the nineteenth-
century acceptance of the doctrine of private freedom without public con-
trol. 140
Nonetheless, for centuries the English people employed statutes prohib-
iting forestalling as a device to address business practices harmful to the
broader interests of society.'41 The regulatory nature of these acts reflected
130. See id. at 916 (discussing regulatory reactions of government to popular discontent
during 1600s).
131. See id. (describing statutory duties of local officials).
132. See id. at 917 (noting prosperity prevalent in England during early 1700s).
133. See HuRST, supra note 52, at 4 (noting eighteenth-century emphasis on private
economic utility of corporation and relegation of public function to secondary status); Jones,
supra note 94, at 917 (noting lack of eighteenth-century legislative activity directed against
business).
134. See Jones, supra note 94, at 918 (discussing repeal of many acts against forestalling).
135. See id. at 917-18 (noting renewed complaints against forestallers).
136. See id. at 918 (noting public complaints against widespread speculation).
137. See id. at 917 (noting decision in late 1700s to again enforce acts against forestalling).
138. See Raskind, supra note 117, at 891-92 (noting Adam Smith's influence on need for
no economic regulation by government).
139. See Smith, supra note 112, at 1571-73 (citing acts abrogating statutes prohibiting
forestalling).
140. See Raskind, supra note 117, at 891 (discussing Parliament's purposes behind repeal
of forestalling statutes); Smith, supra note 112, at 1571-73 (noting repeal of forestalling acts
favored merchants' profit interest); infra notes 149-91 and accompanying text (summarizing
nineteenth-century rejection of idea private corporations should be publicly controlled).
141. See Jones, supra note 94, at 919-20 (noting centuries of measures enacted to restrain
manipulation of markets). In 1800 a writer provided the following definition of forestalling:
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the societal inclination that government possessed a duty to suppress eco-
nomic activities harmful to societal welfare. 42 The ready willingness of
earlier societies to purge the markets of those corporate participants with
fraudulent inclinations harmonized with the contemporary view of corpo-
rations in which all corporate organizations possessed concomitant public
and private dimensions.
43
V. THE AMeRiCAN CONCEPTION OF CORPORATIONS
Early American corporations inherited the dual public and private
dimensions of their English antecedents. 1" During the formative years of
our republic, essential public matters such as canals, banking, insurance,
colleges and utilities'41 occupied the majority of the corporations in exis-
Forestalling, commonly speaking, means, to market before the public, or, to antic-
ipate or prevent the public market; but, legally understood, it has a greater signifi-
cation, for it comprehends all unlawful endeavors to enhance the price of any
commodity, and all practices which have an apparent tendency thereto, such as,
spreading false rumors; buying commodities in the market before the accustomed
hour; buying and selling again the same articles in the same market; .... No
attempt of this kind can be looked upon in any other light-than as offence against
the public, as it apparently tends to put a check upon trade to the general
inconvenience of the people, by putting it out of their power to supply themselves
with any commodity, unless at an unreasonable expense; ....
Id. at 919 (emphasis added).
142. See HoLwswoRTH, supra note 108, at 375 (noting public approval of protective
governmental regulation).
143. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (describing dual public-private nature
of early corporateness).
144. See GoRDoN S. WOOD, THE RADIcAntsM OF THE AMERicAN REVOLUTION 319 (1992)
(noting in early America no sharp distinction existed between public and private corporations);
Ronald E. Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American Business Corporation, 52 Bus.
HIST. Rav. 30, 30-33 (1978) (noting public dimension to early profit-seeking American cor-
porations); Note, supra note 7, at 1886 (arguing business ventures retained their mixed public-
private character in antebellum America). As late as the 1840s, the Whig party argued
corporations were models of how commerce and virtue could be linked to benefit the public
good. Id. at 1893.
145. See 1 Josm'H S. DAVIs, EssAYs N THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AmRCAN CORPORATIONS
3-107 (1917) (arguing most corporations in American colonies pursued public-oriented endeav-
ors); FRIaniwA, supra note 68, at 182, 511 (noting "public" purposes served by most "private"
businesses of early America); HunsT, supra note 52, at 15-17 (noting public nature of early
American corporations). Of the 317 charters granted by the colonies and states between 1780
and 1801, 96% involved transportation, banks and public services. Id. at 17. The other 4%
of the charters were for general business corporations. Id.; see Simeon E. Baldwin, American
Business Corporations Before 1789, 8 AM. HIsT. R v. 449, 449-65 (1902) (noting many early
American corporations were matters of public enterprise); Allen D. Boyer, Federalism and
Corporation Law: Drawing the Line in State Takeover Regulation, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 1037,
1042 (1986) (noting readily apparent quasi-public nature of early American corporations);
Barzelay & Smith, supra note 77, at 90 (noting most early American corporations involved
transportation and banks). Contemporary popular thought did not consider even business
corporations to be private entities. Id.
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tence. 46 At the time of the Constitutional Convention few legal distinctions
existed between public and private corporations; all corporations continued
to possess relatively similar powers and responsibilities. 47 The Founders
recognized the utility, as well as the impressive heritage, of maintaining the
virtuous equilibrium between the coexisting public and private dimensions
of all corporate institutions.' 4"
But within the Founders' lifetimes, a profound philosophical develop-
ment in the history of corporations was underway, the culmination of which
would lead to the fracturing of the historically dual nature of all corporate
entities into the currently distinct categories of public corporations and
private corporations. 49 By the end of the nineteenth century, the historical
notion that all corporations should be susceptible to both a degree of public
control and a degree of private freedom from public control appeared as
simplistic and far removed as it seems to twentieth-century contemporaries.
That this division came to fruition in nineteenth-century America should
not strike one as paradoxical. Madisonian America inherited a tradition of
political and legal thought from England that viewed the world as sharply
divided between two antagonistic poles: The Lockean individual and the
Hobbesian state. 50 According to Locke, the individual possessed certain
inviolable natural rights that limited the power of the state, including the
economic liberty to hold property. 5 ' The private rights of the Lockean
146. See HuRsT, supra note 52, at 14, 17 (noting colonial and state legislatures chartered
317 business corporations from 1780 to 1801); WooD, supra note 144, at 321 (noting states
issued 11 charters of incorporation between 1781 and 1785, 22 more between 1786 and 1790,
114 more between 1791 and 1795, and nearly 1800 additional charters between 1800 and 1807);
Handlin & Handlin, supra note 77, at 4 (stating almost 350 corporations received charters
between 1783 and 1801).
147. See HuRsT, supra note 52, at 7 (arguing corporate law in America developed no
separate policies or rules for private business corporations until end of eighteenth century);
NADER ET AL., supra note 16, at 33 (noting early American corporate law made no distinction
between public and private corporations); Frug, supra note 6, at 1094 (stating "[u]ntil the
early nineteenth century, no such distinction [between public and private corporations] ...
existed either in America or in England, since all such corporations possessed similar legal
powers and protections."); Handlin & Handlin, supra note 77, at 19 (arguing neither eighteenth-
century England nor America accepted distinction between public and private corporations).
148. See Boyer, supra note 145, at 1042 (stating "[w]hen the Founders thought of
corporations, they thought of quasi-governmental, quasi-sovereign entities."); Handlin &
Handlin, supra note 77, at 17-19 (arguing in 1780s corporateness did not imply freedom from
interference by state); see also Note, supra note 7, at 1889-92 (describing early American
distrust of corporations).
149. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text (describing current divided conception
of corporations).
150. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (describing Madisonian political theory);
see also Frug, supra note 6, at 1087-95 (noting influence of Lockean and Hobbesian political
traditions).
151. See JOHN LoCKE, Two TaEATnEs OF GovwsmENrr 188-94 (Thomas I. Cook ed.,
1947) (1690) (asserting vested property rights of individuals). According to Locke:
The supreme power cannot take from any man part of his property without his own
consent; if for the preservation of property being the end of government and that
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individual contrasted sharply with positivism, as advocated by Hobbes,
which placed the interests of the individual as subordinate to the command
of the state. 5 2
This tendency to divide, the world solely between the public power of
the state and the private right of the individual led late eighteenth- and
early nineteenth-century American legal thought to view the enigmatic
corporation skeptically, if not with distrust. 3 A product of medieval society,
the corporation exhibited traits of both axioms:' 4 its private dimension
encouraged the freedom to accumulate individual wealth, yet the corpora-
tion's public dimension subjected it to social control restricting freedom of
individual enterprise.
5
It did not appear feasible to contemporaries in this well-demarcated
world of apparently irreconcilable spheres of public power and private right
to retain the corporation's historically dual character. 56 Nor did it appear
possible under the balanced Madisonian constitutional framework either to
for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the people
should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering
into society, which was the end for which they entered into it-too gross an absurdity
for any man to own. Men, therefore, in society having property, they have such
right to the goods which by the law of the community are theirs, that nobody hath
a right to take there substance or any part of it from them without their own
consent; without this, they have no property at all.
Id. at 191-92.; see also supra note 1 (describing Lockean liberal political theory).
152. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 170-78 (J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1976) (1651)
(asserting need for power of state over its individual components). Hobbes argued power in
the hands of individual rightholders inhibited the governing state's power to command. Id.
Discussing "those things that weaken or tend to the dissolution of a commonwealth," Hobbes
considered that:
Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use
of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from
perishing by internal diseases....
Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is ... the great number of Corporations;
which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like
wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man. To which may be added, the Liberty of
Disputing against absolute Power, by pretenders to Political Prudence; which though
bred for the most part in the Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines,
are perpetually meddling with the Fundamentall Lawes, to the molestation of the
Common-wealth; ....
Id. at 170, 177 ; see also supra note 1 (describing Hobbesian republican political tradition).
153. See Note, supra note 7, at 1889-92 (describing nineteenth-century distrust of corpo-
rations as intermediate bodies standing between public power of state and private liberty of
individual); supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (describing Madisonian uneasiness with
corporations).
154. See Frug, supra note 6, at 1099 (discussing both public power and individual freedom
aspects of corporations).
155. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (discussing dual nature of previous
corporations).
156. See Frug, supra note 6, at 1099 (noting corporation represented an anomaly to
emerging Madisonian thought).
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subvert the economic liberty of the individual to the complete political





To resolve this intractable problem-a confrontation between the public
power of the state and the private rights of the individual-early nineteenth-
century legal doctrine took the unprecedented step of fracturing the histor-
ically dual nature of corporateness into two separate entities.," One, the
private corporation, assimilated to the private freedom of the Lockean
individual in society while the other, the public corporation, succumbed to
the public power of the Hobbesian state.5 9 For the first time in history, a
cognizable legal distinction existed among mercantile entities.'6 Troubled
by the intermediate nature of the corporate form, nineteenth-century thinkers
confronted the corporation as one might expect in a polarized world-they
severed it. As a result, society could manage the corporation much easier
as it, like society itself, was divided between individuals and the state.1
6'
Resolution of the intellectual crisis regarding corporations only provided
the philosophical underpinnings for the nineteenth-century transformation
of the corporation into its current bifurcated form. It still remained to be
seen whether legal doctrine would adapt functionally to the new corporate
ideology. In the seminal 1819 case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 62 the United State Supreme Court certified the legitimacy of
the distinction between public and private corporations. 63 An ardent Fed-
eralist and Lockean defender of vested property rights, Chief Justice John
Marshall used the Dartmouth College case to commit those principles to
legal doctrine.1 4 Marshall employed the Contracts Clause' 6 as the consti-
tutional vehicle for the Court's holding that the property rights of private
157. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (noting purpose of Madisonian system
of government to maintain equilibrium between state sovereignty and individual freedom).
158. See Frug, supra note 6, at 1099 (discussing early nineteenth-century division of
corporation into two separate entities).
159. See id. at 1099-1100 (noting emergence of private corporation as individual rightholder
and public corporation as state-controlled entity).
160. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (arguing prior to nineteenth century
neither societal thought nor legal doctrine considered public and private corporations distinct).
161. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (noting division of Madisonian societies
between individual and state).
162. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
163. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 625-39 (1819).
The Dartmouth College case arose when the New Hampshire legislature attempted to assume
control of Dartmouth by appointing its own board of overseers. Id. at 626-27. Dartmouth's
trustees sued claiming New Hampshire's action violated the college's corporate charter. Id.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court previously ruled against the trustees deeming the college
a public corporation. Id. at 625. On appeal, Chief Justice Marshall reversed the New Hampshire
court by classifying Dartmouth as a private corporation. Id. at 633-39.
164. See Barzelay & Smith, supra note 77, at 95 (describing Marshall's political philoso-
phy).
165. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing
the Obligations of Contracts .... ).
1014
CORPORA TE BAR
corporations were analogous to the Lockean individual's rights in property
and, accordingly, commanded protection from antagonistic popular legis-
latures. '6
Under the Madisonian constitutional framework, individuals possess a
certain scope of immunity from majority rule.1 67 By endowing the private
corporation with the constitutional privilege to hold property on an equal
basis with individuals, thus immunizing the property of private corporations
from legislative abrogation, the Dartmouth College case set the stage for
subsequent courts to further insulate the private corporation from a signif-
icant measure of social control, denying the corporation's actual history.
16
166. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 643-50. Under the Dartmouth College
decision the scope of protected property rights divided private from public corporations. Id.
at 643-54.; see also FREDMAN, supra note 68, at 197 (noting Dartmouth College intended to
secure and protect corporate property interests from shifting winds of public opinion). Friedman
concedes Dartmouth College did not have an immediate effect on the everyday law of
corporations. Id. at 197-98. Nevertheless, Dartmouth College ideologically and functionally set
the stage for future developments insulating corporate property from public control. See Harry
N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REv.
767, 781 (1989) (noting contract clause served as initial constitutional restraint on state
regulation of economic activity); infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text (noting cases after
Dartmouth College immunizing corporations from social control).
In a concurring opinion in Dartmouth College, Justice Story articulated where to draw
the line between public and private corporations:
Another division of corporations is into public and private. Public corporations are
generally esteemed such as exist for public political purposes only, such as towns,
cities, parishes, and counties; and in many respects they are so, although they involve
some private interests; but strictly speaking, public corporations are such only as
are founded by the government for public purposes, where the whole interests belong
also to the government. If, therefore, the foundation be private, though under the
charter of the government, the corporation is private .... For instance, a bank
created by the government for its own uses, whose stock is exclusively owned by
the government, is, in the strictest sense, a public corporation .... But a bank,
whose stock is owned by private persons, is a private corporation, although it is
erected by the government, and its objects and operations partake of a public nature.
The same doctrine may be affirmed of insurance, canal, bridge, and turnpike
companies. In all these cases, the uses may, in a certain sense, be called public, but
the corporations are private ....
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 668-69 (Story, J., concurring).
While Dartmouth College was the first Supreme Court case to develop the distinction
between public and private corporations fully, previously in Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 43, 51-52 (1815), Justice Story briefly had alluded to the distinction.
167. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (discussing Madisonian political theory).
168. See FRiEDMAN, supra note 68, at 197 (noting contemporaries understood Dartmouth
College as removing large part of public control over economic affairs); supra notes 78-82
and accompanying text (describing historical subjection of corporation to degree of social
control); see also HuRsT, supra note 52, at 62-63 (arguing Dartmouth College's holding that
private corporations enjoyed protection of contracts clause "was a clear-cut act of judicial
lawmaking").
Although the Dartmouth College holding certainly protected the property rights of private
corporations from a measure of social control, the case also held a corporation possesses only
those rights granted by the state. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (citing Dartmouth
College for proposition that corporations owe existence to positive law).
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That the social control of the private corporation reached its low ebb
in the 1880s with the Supreme Court's assumption in Santa Clara County
v. Southern Pacific Railroad69 that a corporation is a constitutional "per-
son" under the Fourteenth Amendment did not occur by happenstance. 70
The affirmation of the private corporation as a constitutional person reso-
nated with the ideological perception that the private corporation possessed
the role of the Lockean individual in society.' 7' In addition, corporate
personhood had the attendant functional effect of facilitating the corpora-
tization of the economy. 7 2 By elevating the private corporation to the
constitutional status and immunities of an individual person, the Santa
Clara case and its progeny' 71 fueled the emerging capitalist economy of the
169. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
170. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (declaring
corporations to be persons for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
Prior to oral argument in Santa Clara, Chief Justice Waite briefly stated to counsel that "[t]he
court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny any person ... the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does."
Id. at 396.
The difficulty with extending constitutional rights to corporations is that the Constitution
nowhere mentions corporations. See HuRsT, supra note 52, at 113 (noting Framers included
no reference to corporations in Constitution). Only "persons" have rights under the Consti-
tution. Several Justices later questioned the Santa Clara proposition that a corporation is a
constitutional person. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 262 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(questioning casualness of Santa Clara ruling); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S.
562, 580 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating "the Santa Clara case was wrong and should
be overruled."); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85-90 (1938) (Black,
J., dissenting) (arguing Fourteenth Amendment not intended to apply to corporate persons).
Commentators also criticize Santa Clara. See Huasr, supra note 52, at 66-67, 113-115
(arguing Court's decision in Santa Clara to protect corporate assets as "property" of "persons"
by substantive reading of Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment was as much
exercise of judicial lawmaking as it had been in Dartmouth College to bring corporate charters
within Contracts Clause); John L. Flynn, The Jurisprudence of Corporate Personhood: The
Misuse of a Legal Concept, in CoRPoAroNs AND Socmary: PowER AND RESPONsmtrry 131-
41 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) (questioning Santa Clara's legal
methodology). According to Flynn, Chief Justice Waite's pronouncement of corporate person-
hood in Santa Clara resembled a dictatorial edict rather than legal analysis. Id. at 133.;
Howard J. Graham, An Innocent Abroad: The Constitutional Corporate "Person", 2 UCLA
L. REv. 155, 159-60 (1955) (criticizing absence of opinion on point of corporate personality
in Santa Clara); David L. Ratner, Corporations and the Constitution, 15 U.S.F. L. Ra,. 11,
15 (1981) (noting "summary conclusion" in Santa Clara that corporations were persons
protected by Fourteenth Amendment).
171. See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth-century assim-
ilation of private corporation to role of Lockean individual in society); see also FamDmAN,
supra note 68, at 521 (noting irony of employing Fourteenth Amendment, designed to protect
newly freed slaves, as stronghold for corporations).
172. See Samuels, supra note 67, at 121 (noting individualization of corporation paralleled
development of giant corporations). Samuels further notes the individualization of the corpo-
ration, ironically, furthered the decline of individualist, entrepreneurial capitalism in America.
Id.
173. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990)
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era by freeing business from governmental regulation, allowing business to
(noting corporate speech is within ambit of First Amendment); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 245 (1986) (holding unconstitutional statute burdening corpora-
tion's first amendment liberties); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S.
1, 9-18 (1986) (extending first amendment protection to corporations); FEC v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 495 (1985) (same); FEC v. National Right
to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-11 (1982) (recognizing but limiting first amendment
protection of corporate speech); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980) (extending first amendment protection to corporations); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-44 (1980) (same); First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 (1978) (same); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568-76 (1977) (applying double jeopardy'protection to corporations);
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353-54 (1977) (extending corporations
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 501-02 (1952) (safeguarding corporations' first amendment interests); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (reaffirming corporations are "persons" within meaning
of Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of Fourteenth Amendment); Coombes v. Getz,
285 U.S. 434, 441-42 (1932) (holding takings clause limits state's power to repeal or amend
corporate charter); Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544,
550 (1923) (affirming Santa Clara's decision that corporations are "persons" within meaning
of Fourteenth Amendment); Atchison, Top. & S. Fe R.R. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56, 59 (1915)
(stating constitutional guaranty of protection of equal laws extends to corporations); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (entitling corporations to fourth amendment immunity against
unreasonable searches and seizures); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898) (describing
issue of whether corporations are persons under fourteenth amendment as settled); Chicago,
B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (taking property without just compensation
violates corporation's fourteenth amendment right of due process); Covington & Lexington
Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) (indicating well-settled understanding
that corporations are persons within meaning of Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses);
Charlotte, Colum. & Aug. R.R. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 391 (1892) (holding private
corporations are persons within meaning of Fourteenth Amendment); Chicago, M. & St. P.
R.R. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 452-59 (1890) (extending constitutional protections of due
process and equal protection to corporations); Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Beckwith, 129
U.S. 26, 28 (1889) (extending fourteenth amendment due process protection to corporations);
Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188-89 (1888) (including private corpo-
rations under designation of "person" in Fourteenth Amendment); see also Monell v. De-
partment of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978) (noting by 1871 corporations were treated
as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory purposes). But cf.
California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 71-72 (1974) (denying corporate officer
privilege against self-incrimination on behalf of corporation); United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (withholding corporation's right to privacy); Oklahoma Press
Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204-05, 208 (limiting corporation's fourth amendment
protection against searches and seizures); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944)
(limiting corporation's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 379-86 (1911) (withholding fifth amendment's protection against self-
incrimination from corporations); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 284-85 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (comparing constitutional protections
extended and denied corporations); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 580 n.3
(1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (listing cases assuming Constitution protects corporations).
Prior to the Santa Clara decision, the Supreme Court analogized corporations with natural
persons in context of corporate citizenship for federal jurisdictional purposes. See Louisville,
Cinc. & Char. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 557-58 (1844) (holding corporation
should be deemed "an artificial person" and that although "in some particulars [a corporation]
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expand exponentially. 7 4 But by providing the corporation with constitutional
status coextensive to that of a natural person, thereby entitling the corpo-
ration to a large degree of immunity from majority rule, the line of cases
beginning in Dartmouth College wrenched the corporation free of its historic
exposure to social control.
7
1
Not coincidentally, the late nineteenth century featured the triumph of
another development of equal effect in removing the private corporation
from public control. 76 Prior to the nineteenth century, in both England
and America, each instance of incorporation required a special act by the
sovereign. 7  These special charters were tailor-made to the particular incor-
porators and included whatever restrictions the granting sovereign deemed
appropriate to those being incorporated.' 78 Such a cumbersome, yet discern-
ing process served a meritorious purpose by assuring that only those
endeavors that met the standard of public service would possess corporate
advantages."79 But to the egalitarian Jacksonian America of the mid-nine-
differs from a natural person," in "the manner in which it can sue and be sued, it is
substantially ... a citizen of the state which created it"). Cf. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 584, 585-86 (1839) (holding c6rporation is not "citizen" within meaning of
Fourth Amendment's guaranty of privileges and immunities).
174. See Flynn, supra note 170, at 132 (noting how Santa Clara insulated corporations
from large measure of governmental regulation).
175. See id. (discussing effect of recognizing constitutional status of corporation). Flynn
notes in a Madisonian system individuals possess a certain scope of immunity-defined by the
Bill of Rights-from social control. Id. Elevating the corporation to a constitutional status
with many of the immunities enjoyed by individuals in society necessarily diminishes social
control over the corporation. See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations
and the Bill of Rights, 41 HArSTNGs L.J. 577, 577-665 (1990) (surveying cases in which
corporations' invocation of Bill of Rights shielded corporations from governmental regulation).
In addition, constitutional corporate persons fail to bear many of the burdens imposed by the
Constitution on natural persons. See Miller, supra note 16, at 83 (noting corporations are not
asked to go to war or to serve on juries).
The connection between Dartmouth College and Santa Clara initially may not appear
clear. However, with the Santa Clara decision the Fourteenth Amendment replaced the
Marshall-era contract clause as the principal source of constitutional protection of corporate
assets. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76
GEo. L.J. 1593, 1601 (1988) (noting concurrent rise of Fourteenth Amendment and fall of
Contract Clause as primary source of constitutional protection of corporations); Butler &
Ribstein, supra note 166, at 781 (same).
176. See FRMDMAN, supra note 68, at 512 (arguing major event in corporation law between
1800 and 1850 involved development of general incorporation statute); Millon, supra note 72,
at 905-10 (discussing rise of general incorporation statutes); Note, supra note 7, at 1883
(arguing general incorporation laws represent antebellum America's major contribution to
development of private corporation).
177. See Millon, supra note 72, at 906-07 (noting until nineteenth century, corporate
charters required special acts by legislature).
178. See FRiEDMAN, supra note 68, at 188 (noting state legislatures granted charters
"tailor-made to the case at hand"); Millon, supra note 72, at 906 (same).
179. See Berle, Inheritance, supra note 52, at 197-99 (noting by requiring special charters
sovereign maintained control over those entitled to corporate privileges).
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teenth century, special charters represented special privilege.8 0 To rectify
this perceived inequality of opportunity, state legislatures promoted the
widespread availability of corporate status by passing general incorporation
acts,' 8 ' which dispensed with the need for a special legislative act for each
incorporation by making the privilege of doing business in corporate form
available to any group that fulfilled certain formalities.
82
The initial general incorporation statutes typically specified the particular
purposes a corporation could pursue,' prescribed dollar restrictions on asset
value and indebtedness,s 4 and imposed durational limits on corporate lifes-
pan.1'1 While these general incorporation statutes sanctioned equality of op-
portunity, their attending proscriptive features ensured that all corporations
would remain subject to some degree of public control1l 6 However, soon
thereafter state legislatures, spurred by the desire to attract revenue-producing
180. See AR 'mn M. ScmEsrtNER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 336-37 (1945) (noting
general incorporation acts constitute direct legacy from Jacksonian democracy). The hostility
Jacksonians displayed toward special charters stemmed from their perception that special
charters bred corruption and monopoly. Id.; Hovenkamp, supra note 175, at 1634-35 (arguing
Jacksonians were not opposed to corporations on principle so much as they believed special
charter denied equal access to corporation as method of doing business); Millon, supra note
1, at 1255 (noting purpose of general incorporation statutes was to make advantages of
incorporation readily available to public).
181. See GEORoE EvANs, Busms INCOPORAONS I nr TB UNrD STATES 1800-1943 11
(1948) (noting Connecticut passed first general incorporation law in 1837); FRDMN, supra
note 68, at 194-95 (arguing efficiency concerns also prompted state legislatures to pass general
incorporation acts); Millon, supra note 1, at 1255 (noting by 1870 general incorporation laws
had begun to supplant special charters in most states).
182. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-619 (Michie 1989) (listing minimum incorporation requirements
in Virginia). To incorporate in Virginia, each applicant must provide the corporation's name, the
number of shares the corporation is authorized to issue, and the addresses of both the corporation's
initial registered office and agent. Id. Once the requirements for the articles of incorporation have
been complied with and all mandatory fees have been paid, the state of Virginia must issue a
certificate of incorporation, and corporate existence begins. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-621 (Michie
1989); see generally Richard W. Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and
Investor Protection, 23 LAw & CoNTrEn-p. PROs. 193 (1958) (addressing whether state incorporation
statutes should be enabling or include provisions to protect interests of shareholders and creditors);
Elvin R. Latty, Why are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling?", 50 CoRNm L.Q. 599,
601-02 (1965) (discussing enabling philosophy underlying modem American business incorporation
statutes).
183. See NADER r A .. , supra note 16, at 37 (noting limited purposes imposed by early
general incorporation statutes); Millon, supra note 72, at 907-08 (same).
184. See NADER ET AL., supra note 16, at 37 (noting well into nineteenth century most states
retained limitations on amounts of capital and indebtedness); Boyer, supra note 145, at 1043
(noting corporations historically had been confined to ceilings on indebtedness); Milon, supra note
72, at 909 (noting retention of asset and indebtedness limits in early general incorporation acts).
i85. See FRmDmN, supra note 68, at 190 (noting durational limits were common element of
corporate charters in early nineteenth century); NADER Er AL., supra note 16, at 37 (noting early
general acts imposed durational limits on corporate existence); Milion, supra note 72, at 909
(noting durational limits often varied from 20 to 50 years).
186. See Mllon, supra note 72, at 909-10 (arguing restrictive features of early general
incorporation statutes aimed to prevent corporations from achieving uncontrollable private free-
dom).
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corporations, began to liberalize their general incorporation statutes by au-
thorizing incorporation for "any lawful purpose" and by loosening, then
abolishing, the restrictions on corporate lifespan, capitalization and indebted-
ness. 
87
By the early twentieth century in America, a convergence of deregulatory
premises on ideological, judicial and legislative fronts had swept away the
public control of corporations so instinctive to our English forebears.' A
new vision-of the corporation emerged-one that entitled the corporation to
the constitutional rights of a natural-person while reprieving the corporation
from much of its historic subjection to public control.87 A revolution in the
corporate concept transpired in nineteenth-century America. 9' No longer did
society expect corporations either to be attentive to the concerns of the populace
at large or subject to democratic control.' 9' Nineteenth-century American
society essentially abdicated public control of the private corporation.
VI. CONCLUSION
By holding corporate executives responsive to the interests of the general
public, the corporate bar provisions of the Remedies Act may signal an
attempt by late twentieth-century America to reestablish a semblance of the
historic element of social control over private corporations abandoned by
nineteenth-century America.'9 If so, the corporate bar recalls an earlier,
187. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing
competition among states for corporate charters as race "not of diligence but of laxity"); FRiEmsAN,
supra note 68, at 524-25 (discussing lure of easy money as incentive for states to abolish previous
restrictions on corporate capacities); Boyer, supra note 145, at 1043 (noting by 1875 states commonly
allowed incorporation for "any lawful purpose"); Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdic-
tional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEAL SruD. 129, 129-66 (1985)
(tracing nineteenth-century deregulatory impulse); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments
in Business Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 50 HARv. L. REv. 27, 32-55 (1936) (contrasting
Massachusetts's more restrictive incorporation statutes with general nineteenth-century trend).
New Jersey and Delaware led the "race to the bottom" by excising aspects of their corporate
laws that traditionally inhibited corporate growth and maintained corporate legitimacy. See NADER
Er A.., supra note 16, at 43-61 (tracing deregulatory developments in New Jersey and Delaware);
Cary, supra note 16, at 663-68 (discussing states' tendencies to adopt increasingly lenient incor-
poration laws); Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV. L. Rv.
198, 198-212 (1899) (discussing New Jersey's role in facilitating corporate growth); Millon, supra
note 72 at 911-13 (discussing deregulatory motivations in New Jersey and Delaware).
188. See Hovenkamp, supra note 175, at 1638-40 (suggesting general incorporation acts
relieved private corporations of historic public dimension by shifting public dimension predomi-
nantly to public corporations); supra notes 149-91 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth-
century movement to confer private freedom on corporations).
189. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (describing corporation's historic subjection
to degree of public control).
190. See FsimmAN, supra note 68, at 511 (arguing by 1900 "[o]f the original law of
corporations-from Blackstone's day-hardly a stone was left unturned.
191. See id. at 512 (noting by twentieth century "corporations could do as they wished,
arrange their affairs as they pleased, exercise any power desired .... ."); see also supra notes 72-
75 and accompanying text (stating current societal expectations of private corporations).
192. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (arguing Congress enacted corporate bar
to protect society at large form corporate excesses).
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broader vision of the corporation in which societal willingness to impose
restrictions on corporate activity on behalf of the general, public whose welfare
appeared threatened by certain features of corporate activity reflected the
prevailing notion that all corporations should be subject to a degree of public
control.' 93 These societies struggled to maintain a proper balance between a
corporation's counterpoised, Madisonian attributes of public power and private
freedom.'9 The historic antidote to society's indignation toward corporate
activities contrary to the public welfare had been for the state to restore public
control over corporations by conscripting private corporate freedom.1 95 This
earlier way of thinking about the corporation fell by the wayside during the
nineteenth-century reconceptualization of the corporation.19 By the early twen-
tieth century, society at large no longer expected the private corporation to
be subject to control in the public interest. Conversely, society expected the
unfettered private corporation to embellish its private freedom by relentlessly
pursuing shareholder welfare. 19
Congress' current inclination-as demonstrated by the corporate bar pro-
visions of the Remedies Act-to regulate corporate activity that negatively
affects the welfare of nonshareholder constituencies, however, raises questions
whether the twentieth-century conception of the corporation is too narrowly
conceived. The corporate bar certainly seems incongruent with orthodox
thinking on the private corporation and may reflect a desire of society at large
to have something to say about corporate endeavors. As destabilizing to
established assumptions about the basic objectives of private corporations as
the corporate bar may appear to be, when viewed from an historical perspec-
tive, neither the method'ss nor the objective'9 of the Remedies Act is unprece-
dented.
Justin Toby McDonald
193. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (arguing prior societies maintained a
degree of social control over corporate activity for benefit of general public).
194. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing corporations' historically
coextensive characteristics of private rights and social control).
195. See supra notes 102-09, 111-43 and accompanying text (discussing remedies imposed by
earlier societies to curtail corporate excesses).
196. See supra notes 149-91 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth-century transfor-
mation of nature of corporateness).
197. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text (discussing twentieth-century conception
of corporations).
198. Compare supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text (describing corporate bar's disqual-
ification of fraudulent corporate managers from corporate profession) with supra notes 120-37
and accompanying text (discussing prior methods of purging fraudulent market traders from
trading profession).
199. Compare supra notes 25-28, 46-51 and accompanying text (noting purpose of corporate
bar to ensure public confidence in securities markets) with supra notes 110-19, 141-43 and
accompanying text (noting purpose of forestalling statutes to preserve integrity in early trading
markets).
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